AZL-51497 (CVE-2024-50017)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2024-10-21 19:15 – Updated: 2026-11-18 05:33 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/mm/ident_map: Use gbpages only where full GB page should be mapped.
When ident_pud_init() uses only GB pages to create identity maps, large ranges of addresses not actually requested can be included in the resulting table; a 4K request will map a full GB. This can include a lot of extra address space past that requested, including areas marked reserved by the BIOS. That allows processor speculation into reserved regions, that on UV systems can cause system halts.
Only use GB pages when map creation requests include the full GB page of space. Fall back to using smaller 2M pages when only portions of a GB page are included in the request.
No attempt is made to coalesce mapping requests. If a request requires a map entry at the 2M (pmd) level, subsequent mapping requests within the same 1G region will also be at the pmd level, even if adjacent or overlapping such requests could have been combined to map a full GB page. Existing usage starts with larger regions and then adds smaller regions, so this should not have any great consequence.
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-50017 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: < 6.6.78.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.78.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nx86/mm/ident_map: Use gbpages only where full GB page should be mapped.\n\nWhen ident_pud_init() uses only GB pages to create identity maps, large\nranges of addresses not actually requested can be included in the resulting\ntable; a 4K request will map a full GB. This can include a lot of extra\naddress space past that requested, including areas marked reserved by the\nBIOS. That allows processor speculation into reserved regions, that on UV\nsystems can cause system halts.\n\nOnly use GB pages when map creation requests include the full GB page of\nspace. Fall back to using smaller 2M pages when only portions of a GB page\nare included in the request.\n\nNo attempt is made to coalesce mapping requests. If a request requires a\nmap entry at the 2M (pmd) level, subsequent mapping requests within the\nsame 1G region will also be at the pmd level, even if adjacent or\noverlapping such requests could have been combined to map a full GB page.\nExisting usage starts with larger regions and then adds smaller regions, so\nthis should not have any great consequence.",
"id": "AZL-51497",
"modified": "2026-11-18T05:33:41Z",
"published": "2024-10-21T19:15:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-50017"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "CVE-2024-50017 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.78.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2024-50017"
]
}
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