AZL-51533 (CVE-2024-50023)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2024-10-21 20:15 – Updated: 2024-10-31 05:18 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: phy: Remove LED entry from LEDs list on unregister
Commit c938ab4da0eb ("net: phy: Manual remove LEDs to ensure correct ordering") correctly fixed a problem with using devm_ but missed removing the LED entry from the LEDs list.
This cause kernel panic on specific scenario where the port for the PHY is torn down and up and the kmod for the PHY is removed.
On setting the port down the first time, the assosiacted LEDs are correctly unregistered. The associated kmod for the PHY is now removed. The kmod is now added again and the port is now put up, the associated LED are registered again. On putting the port down again for the second time after these step, the LED list now have 4 elements. With the first 2 already unregistered previously and the 2 new one registered again.
This cause a kernel panic as the first 2 element should have been removed.
Fix this by correctly removing the element when LED is unregistered.
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-50023 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: < 6.6.57.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.57.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: phy: Remove LED entry from LEDs list on unregister\n\nCommit c938ab4da0eb (\"net: phy: Manual remove LEDs to ensure correct\nordering\") correctly fixed a problem with using devm_ but missed\nremoving the LED entry from the LEDs list.\n\nThis cause kernel panic on specific scenario where the port for the PHY\nis torn down and up and the kmod for the PHY is removed.\n\nOn setting the port down the first time, the assosiacted LEDs are\ncorrectly unregistered. The associated kmod for the PHY is now removed.\nThe kmod is now added again and the port is now put up, the associated LED\nare registered again.\nOn putting the port down again for the second time after these step, the\nLED list now have 4 elements. With the first 2 already unregistered\npreviously and the 2 new one registered again.\n\nThis cause a kernel panic as the first 2 element should have been\nremoved.\n\nFix this by correctly removing the element when LED is unregistered.",
"id": "AZL-51533",
"modified": "2024-10-31T05:18:59Z",
"published": "2024-10-21T20:15:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-50023"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "CVE-2024-50023 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.57.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2024-50023"
]
}
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