AZL-52077 (CVE-2024-50072)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2024-10-29 01:15 – Updated: 2025-01-18 06:34 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/bugs: Use code segment selector for VERW operand
Robert Gill reported below #GP in 32-bit mode when dosemu software was executing vm86() system call:
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 4 PID: 4610 Comm: dosemu.bin Not tainted 6.6.21-gentoo-x86 #1 Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge 1950/0H723K, BIOS 2.7.0 10/30/2010 EIP: restore_all_switch_stack+0xbe/0xcf EAX: 00000000 EBX: 00000000 ECX: 00000000 EDX: 00000000 ESI: 00000000 EDI: 00000000 EBP: 00000000 ESP: ff8affdc DS: 0000 ES: 0000 FS: 0000 GS: 0033 SS: 0068 EFLAGS: 00010046 CR0: 80050033 CR2: 00c2101c CR3: 04b6d000 CR4: 000406d0 Call Trace: show_regs+0x70/0x78 die_addr+0x29/0x70 exc_general_protection+0x13c/0x348 exc_bounds+0x98/0x98 handle_exception+0x14d/0x14d exc_bounds+0x98/0x98 restore_all_switch_stack+0xbe/0xcf exc_bounds+0x98/0x98 restore_all_switch_stack+0xbe/0xcf
This only happens in 32-bit mode when VERW based mitigations like MDS/RFDS are enabled. This is because segment registers with an arbitrary user value can result in #GP when executing VERW. Intel SDM vol. 2C documents the following behavior for VERW instruction:
#GP(0) - If a memory operand effective address is outside the CS, DS, ES, FS, or GS segment limit.
CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS macro executes VERW instruction before returning to user space. Use %cs selector to reference VERW operand. This ensures VERW will not #GP for an arbitrary user %ds.
[ mingo: Fixed the SOB chain. ]
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-50072 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: < 6.6.64.2-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.64.2-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nx86/bugs: Use code segment selector for VERW operand\n\nRobert Gill reported below #GP in 32-bit mode when dosemu software was\nexecuting vm86() system call:\n\n general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP\n CPU: 4 PID: 4610 Comm: dosemu.bin Not tainted 6.6.21-gentoo-x86 #1\n Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge 1950/0H723K, BIOS 2.7.0 10/30/2010\n EIP: restore_all_switch_stack+0xbe/0xcf\n EAX: 00000000 EBX: 00000000 ECX: 00000000 EDX: 00000000\n ESI: 00000000 EDI: 00000000 EBP: 00000000 ESP: ff8affdc\n DS: 0000 ES: 0000 FS: 0000 GS: 0033 SS: 0068 EFLAGS: 00010046\n CR0: 80050033 CR2: 00c2101c CR3: 04b6d000 CR4: 000406d0\n Call Trace:\n show_regs+0x70/0x78\n die_addr+0x29/0x70\n exc_general_protection+0x13c/0x348\n exc_bounds+0x98/0x98\n handle_exception+0x14d/0x14d\n exc_bounds+0x98/0x98\n restore_all_switch_stack+0xbe/0xcf\n exc_bounds+0x98/0x98\n restore_all_switch_stack+0xbe/0xcf\n\nThis only happens in 32-bit mode when VERW based mitigations like MDS/RFDS\nare enabled. This is because segment registers with an arbitrary user value\ncan result in #GP when executing VERW. Intel SDM vol. 2C documents the\nfollowing behavior for VERW instruction:\n\n #GP(0) - If a memory operand effective address is outside the CS, DS, ES,\n\t FS, or GS segment limit.\n\nCLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS macro executes VERW instruction before returning to user\nspace. Use %cs selector to reference VERW operand. This ensures VERW will\nnot #GP for an arbitrary user %ds.\n\n[ mingo: Fixed the SOB chain. ]",
"id": "AZL-52077",
"modified": "2025-01-18T06:34:06Z",
"published": "2024-10-29T01:15:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-50072"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "CVE-2024-50072 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.64.2-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2024-50072"
]
}
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