AZL-52969 (CVE-2024-49885)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2024-10-21 18:15 – Updated: 2026-11-18 05:33 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm, slub: avoid zeroing kmalloc redzone
Since commit 946fa0dbf2d8 ("mm/slub: extend redzone check to extra allocated kmalloc space than requested"), setting orig_size treats the wasted space (object_size - orig_size) as a redzone. However with init_on_free=1 we clear the full object->size, including the redzone.
Additionally we clear the object metadata, including the stored orig_size, making it zero, which makes check_object() treat the whole object as a redzone.
These issues lead to the following BUG report with "slub_debug=FUZ init_on_free=1":
[ 0.000000] ============================================================================= [ 0.000000] BUG kmalloc-8 (Not tainted): kmalloc Redzone overwritten [ 0.000000] ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- [ 0.000000] [ 0.000000] 0xffff000010032858-0xffff00001003285f @offset=2136. First byte 0x0 instead of 0xcc [ 0.000000] FIX kmalloc-8: Restoring kmalloc Redzone 0xffff000010032858-0xffff00001003285f=0xcc [ 0.000000] Slab 0xfffffdffc0400c80 objects=36 used=23 fp=0xffff000010032a18 flags=0x3fffe0000000200(workingset|node=0|zone=0|lastcpupid=0x1ffff) [ 0.000000] Object 0xffff000010032858 @offset=2136 fp=0xffff0000100328c8 [ 0.000000] [ 0.000000] Redzone ffff000010032850: cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc ........ [ 0.000000] Object ffff000010032858: cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc ........ [ 0.000000] Redzone ffff000010032860: cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc ........ [ 0.000000] Padding ffff0000100328b4: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ............ [ 0.000000] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc3-next-20240814-00004-g61844c55c3f4 #144 [ 0.000000] Hardware name: NXP i.MX95 19X19 board (DT) [ 0.000000] Call trace: [ 0.000000] dump_backtrace+0x90/0xe8 [ 0.000000] show_stack+0x18/0x24 [ 0.000000] dump_stack_lvl+0x74/0x8c [ 0.000000] dump_stack+0x18/0x24 [ 0.000000] print_trailer+0x150/0x218 [ 0.000000] check_object+0xe4/0x454 [ 0.000000] free_to_partial_list+0x2f8/0x5ec
To address the issue, use orig_size to clear the used area. And restore the value of orig_size after clear the remaining area.
When CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG not defined, (get_orig_size()' directly returns s->object_size. So when using memset to init the area, the size can simply be orig_size, as orig_size returns object_size when CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG not enabled. And orig_size can never be bigger than object_size.
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-49885 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: ≤ 6.6.161.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "6.6.161.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmm, slub: avoid zeroing kmalloc redzone\n\nSince commit 946fa0dbf2d8 (\"mm/slub: extend redzone check to extra\nallocated kmalloc space than requested\"), setting orig_size treats\nthe wasted space (object_size - orig_size) as a redzone. However with\ninit_on_free=1 we clear the full object-\u003esize, including the redzone.\n\nAdditionally we clear the object metadata, including the stored orig_size,\nmaking it zero, which makes check_object() treat the whole object as a\nredzone.\n\nThese issues lead to the following BUG report with \"slub_debug=FUZ\ninit_on_free=1\":\n\n[ 0.000000] =============================================================================\n[ 0.000000] BUG kmalloc-8 (Not tainted): kmalloc Redzone overwritten\n[ 0.000000] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------\n[ 0.000000]\n[ 0.000000] 0xffff000010032858-0xffff00001003285f @offset=2136. First byte 0x0 instead of 0xcc\n[ 0.000000] FIX kmalloc-8: Restoring kmalloc Redzone 0xffff000010032858-0xffff00001003285f=0xcc\n[ 0.000000] Slab 0xfffffdffc0400c80 objects=36 used=23 fp=0xffff000010032a18 flags=0x3fffe0000000200(workingset|node=0|zone=0|lastcpupid=0x1ffff)\n[ 0.000000] Object 0xffff000010032858 @offset=2136 fp=0xffff0000100328c8\n[ 0.000000]\n[ 0.000000] Redzone ffff000010032850: cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc ........\n[ 0.000000] Object ffff000010032858: cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc ........\n[ 0.000000] Redzone ffff000010032860: cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc ........\n[ 0.000000] Padding ffff0000100328b4: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ............\n[ 0.000000] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc3-next-20240814-00004-g61844c55c3f4 #144\n[ 0.000000] Hardware name: NXP i.MX95 19X19 board (DT)\n[ 0.000000] Call trace:\n[ 0.000000] dump_backtrace+0x90/0xe8\n[ 0.000000] show_stack+0x18/0x24\n[ 0.000000] dump_stack_lvl+0x74/0x8c\n[ 0.000000] dump_stack+0x18/0x24\n[ 0.000000] print_trailer+0x150/0x218\n[ 0.000000] check_object+0xe4/0x454\n[ 0.000000] free_to_partial_list+0x2f8/0x5ec\n\nTo address the issue, use orig_size to clear the used area. And restore\nthe value of orig_size after clear the remaining area.\n\nWhen CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG not defined, (get_orig_size()\u0027 directly returns\ns-\u003eobject_size. So when using memset to init the area, the size can simply\nbe orig_size, as orig_size returns object_size when CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG not\nenabled. And orig_size can never be bigger than object_size.",
"id": "AZL-52969",
"modified": "2026-11-18T05:33:41Z",
"published": "2024-10-21T18:15:11Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-49885"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "CVE-2024-49885 affecting package kernel 6.6.161.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2024-49885"
]
}
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