AZL-53153 (CVE-2024-50225)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2024-11-09 11:15 – Updated: 2026-11-18 05:33 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix error propagation of split bios
The purpose of btrfs_bbio_propagate_error() shall be propagating an error of split bio to its original btrfs_bio, and tell the error to the upper layer. However, it's not working well on some cases.
- Case 1. Immediate (or quick) end_bio with an error
When btrfs sends btrfs_bio to mirrored devices, btrfs calls btrfs_bio_end_io() when all the mirroring bios are completed. If that btrfs_bio was split, it is from btrfs_clone_bioset and its end_io function is btrfs_orig_write_end_io. For this case, btrfs_bbio_propagate_error() accesses the orig_bbio's bio context to increase the error count.
That works well in most cases. However, if the end_io is called enough fast, orig_bbio's (remaining part after split) bio context may not be properly set at that time. Since the bio context is set when the orig_bbio (the last btrfs_bio) is sent to devices, that might be too late for earlier split btrfs_bio's completion. That will result in NULL pointer dereference.
That bug is easily reproducible by running btrfs/146 on zoned devices [1] and it shows the following trace.
[1] You need raid-stripe-tree feature as it create "-d raid0 -m raid1" FS.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000020 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 13 Comm: kworker/u32:1 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc7-BTRFS-ZNS+ #474 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-btrfs-5) RIP: 0010:btrfs_bio_end_io+0xae/0xc0 [btrfs] BTRFS error (device dm-0): bdev /dev/mapper/error-test errs: wr 2, rd 0, flush 0, corrupt 0, gen 0 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000006f248 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888005a7f080 RCX: ffffc9000006f1dc RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000000a RDI: ffff888005a7f080 RBP: ffff888011dfc540 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: ffffffff82e508e0 R11: 0000000000000005 R12: ffff88800ddfbe58 R13: ffff888005a7f080 R14: ffff888005a7f158 R15: ffff888005a7f158 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88803ea80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 0000000002e22006 CR4: 0000000000370ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: ? __die_body.cold+0x19/0x26 ? page_fault_oops+0x13e/0x2b0 ? _printk+0x58/0x73 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x5f/0x750 ? exc_page_fault+0x76/0x240 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 ? btrfs_bio_end_io+0xae/0xc0 [btrfs] ? btrfs_log_dev_io_error+0x7f/0x90 [btrfs] btrfs_orig_write_end_io+0x51/0x90 [btrfs] dm_submit_bio+0x5c2/0xa50 [dm_mod] ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 ? blk_try_enter_queue+0x90/0x1e0 __submit_bio+0xe0/0x130 ? ktime_get+0x10a/0x160 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x74/0x100 submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x199/0x410 btrfs_submit_bio+0x7d/0x150 [btrfs] btrfs_submit_chunk+0x1a1/0x6d0 [btrfs] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x74/0x100 ? __folio_start_writeback+0x10/0x2c0 btrfs_submit_bbio+0x1c/0x40 [btrfs] submit_one_bio+0x44/0x60 [btrfs] submit_extent_folio+0x13f/0x330 [btrfs] ? btrfs_set_range_writeback+0xa3/0xd0 [btrfs] extent_writepage_io+0x18b/0x360 [btrfs] extent_write_locked_range+0x17c/0x340 [btrfs] ? __pfx_end_bbio_data_write+0x10/0x10 [btrfs] run_delalloc_cow+0x71/0xd0 [btrfs] btrfs_run_delalloc_range+0x176/0x500 [btrfs] ? find_lock_delalloc_range+0x119/0x260 [btrfs] writepage_delalloc+0x2ab/0x480 [btrfs] extent_write_cache_pages+0x236/0x7d0 [btrfs] btrfs_writepages+0x72/0x130 [btrfs] do_writepages+0xd4/0x240 ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 ? wbc_attach_and_unlock_inode+0x12c/0x290 ? wbc_attach_and_unlock_inode+0x12c/0x29 ---truncated---
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-50225 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: ≤ 6.6.161.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "6.6.161.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbtrfs: fix error propagation of split bios\n\nThe purpose of btrfs_bbio_propagate_error() shall be propagating an error\nof split bio to its original btrfs_bio, and tell the error to the upper\nlayer. However, it\u0027s not working well on some cases.\n\n* Case 1. Immediate (or quick) end_bio with an error\n\nWhen btrfs sends btrfs_bio to mirrored devices, btrfs calls\nbtrfs_bio_end_io() when all the mirroring bios are completed. If that\nbtrfs_bio was split, it is from btrfs_clone_bioset and its end_io function\nis btrfs_orig_write_end_io. For this case, btrfs_bbio_propagate_error()\naccesses the orig_bbio\u0027s bio context to increase the error count.\n\nThat works well in most cases. However, if the end_io is called enough\nfast, orig_bbio\u0027s (remaining part after split) bio context may not be\nproperly set at that time. Since the bio context is set when the orig_bbio\n(the last btrfs_bio) is sent to devices, that might be too late for earlier\nsplit btrfs_bio\u0027s completion. That will result in NULL pointer\ndereference.\n\nThat bug is easily reproducible by running btrfs/146 on zoned devices [1]\nand it shows the following trace.\n\n[1] You need raid-stripe-tree feature as it create \"-d raid0 -m raid1\" FS.\n\n BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000020\n #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode\n #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page\n PGD 0 P4D 0\n Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI\n CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 13 Comm: kworker/u32:1 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc7-BTRFS-ZNS+ #474\n Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011\n Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-btrfs-5)\n RIP: 0010:btrfs_bio_end_io+0xae/0xc0 [btrfs]\n BTRFS error (device dm-0): bdev /dev/mapper/error-test errs: wr 2, rd 0, flush 0, corrupt 0, gen 0\n RSP: 0018:ffffc9000006f248 EFLAGS: 00010246\n RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888005a7f080 RCX: ffffc9000006f1dc\n RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000000a RDI: ffff888005a7f080\n RBP: ffff888011dfc540 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001\n R10: ffffffff82e508e0 R11: 0000000000000005 R12: ffff88800ddfbe58\n R13: ffff888005a7f080 R14: ffff888005a7f158 R15: ffff888005a7f158\n FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88803ea80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\n CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\n CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 0000000002e22006 CR4: 0000000000370ef0\n DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000\n DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400\n Call Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n ? __die_body.cold+0x19/0x26\n ? page_fault_oops+0x13e/0x2b0\n ? _printk+0x58/0x73\n ? do_user_addr_fault+0x5f/0x750\n ? exc_page_fault+0x76/0x240\n ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30\n ? btrfs_bio_end_io+0xae/0xc0 [btrfs]\n ? btrfs_log_dev_io_error+0x7f/0x90 [btrfs]\n btrfs_orig_write_end_io+0x51/0x90 [btrfs]\n dm_submit_bio+0x5c2/0xa50 [dm_mod]\n ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80\n ? blk_try_enter_queue+0x90/0x1e0\n __submit_bio+0xe0/0x130\n ? ktime_get+0x10a/0x160\n ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x74/0x100\n submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x199/0x410\n btrfs_submit_bio+0x7d/0x150 [btrfs]\n btrfs_submit_chunk+0x1a1/0x6d0 [btrfs]\n ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x74/0x100\n ? __folio_start_writeback+0x10/0x2c0\n btrfs_submit_bbio+0x1c/0x40 [btrfs]\n submit_one_bio+0x44/0x60 [btrfs]\n submit_extent_folio+0x13f/0x330 [btrfs]\n ? btrfs_set_range_writeback+0xa3/0xd0 [btrfs]\n extent_writepage_io+0x18b/0x360 [btrfs]\n extent_write_locked_range+0x17c/0x340 [btrfs]\n ? __pfx_end_bbio_data_write+0x10/0x10 [btrfs]\n run_delalloc_cow+0x71/0xd0 [btrfs]\n btrfs_run_delalloc_range+0x176/0x500 [btrfs]\n ? find_lock_delalloc_range+0x119/0x260 [btrfs]\n writepage_delalloc+0x2ab/0x480 [btrfs]\n extent_write_cache_pages+0x236/0x7d0 [btrfs]\n btrfs_writepages+0x72/0x130 [btrfs]\n do_writepages+0xd4/0x240\n ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80\n ? wbc_attach_and_unlock_inode+0x12c/0x290\n ? wbc_attach_and_unlock_inode+0x12c/0x29\n---truncated---",
"id": "AZL-53153",
"modified": "2026-11-18T05:33:41Z",
"published": "2024-11-09T11:15:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-50225"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "CVE-2024-50225 affecting package kernel 6.6.161.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2024-50225"
]
}
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