AZL-53376 (CVE-2024-50147)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2024-11-07 10:15 – Updated: 2025-01-18 06:34 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5: Fix command bitmask initialization
Command bitmask have a dedicated bit for MANAGE_PAGES command, this bit isn't Initialize during command bitmask Initialization, only during MANAGE_PAGES.
In addition, mlx5_cmd_trigger_completions() is trying to trigger completion for MANAGE_PAGES command as well.
Hence, in case health error occurred before any MANAGE_PAGES command have been invoke (for example, during mlx5_enable_hca()), mlx5_cmd_trigger_completions() will try to trigger completion for MANAGE_PAGES command, which will result in null-ptr-deref error.[1]
Fix it by Initialize command bitmask correctly.
While at it, re-write the code for better understanding.
[1] BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in mlx5_cmd_trigger_completions+0x1db/0x600 [mlx5_core] Write of size 4 at addr 0000000000000214 by task kworker/u96:2/12078 CPU: 10 PID: 12078 Comm: kworker/u96:2 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc2_for_upstream_debug_2024_04_07_19_01 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: mlx5_health0000:08:00.0 mlx5_fw_fatal_reporter_err_work [mlx5_core] Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x7e/0xc0 kasan_report+0xb9/0xf0 kasan_check_range+0xec/0x190 mlx5_cmd_trigger_completions+0x1db/0x600 [mlx5_core] mlx5_cmd_flush+0x94/0x240 [mlx5_core] enter_error_state+0x6c/0xd0 [mlx5_core] mlx5_fw_fatal_reporter_err_work+0xf3/0x480 [mlx5_core] process_one_work+0x787/0x1490 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x400/0x400 ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0xda0/0xda0 ? assign_work+0x168/0x240 worker_thread+0x586/0xd30 ? rescuer_thread+0xae0/0xae0 kthread+0x2df/0x3b0 ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x70 ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-50147 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: < 6.6.64.2-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.64.2-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/mlx5: Fix command bitmask initialization\n\nCommand bitmask have a dedicated bit for MANAGE_PAGES command, this bit\nisn\u0027t Initialize during command bitmask Initialization, only during\nMANAGE_PAGES.\n\nIn addition, mlx5_cmd_trigger_completions() is trying to trigger\ncompletion for MANAGE_PAGES command as well.\n\nHence, in case health error occurred before any MANAGE_PAGES command\nhave been invoke (for example, during mlx5_enable_hca()),\nmlx5_cmd_trigger_completions() will try to trigger completion for\nMANAGE_PAGES command, which will result in null-ptr-deref error.[1]\n\nFix it by Initialize command bitmask correctly.\n\nWhile at it, re-write the code for better understanding.\n\n[1]\nBUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in mlx5_cmd_trigger_completions+0x1db/0x600 [mlx5_core]\nWrite of size 4 at addr 0000000000000214 by task kworker/u96:2/12078\nCPU: 10 PID: 12078 Comm: kworker/u96:2 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc2_for_upstream_debug_2024_04_07_19_01 #1\nHardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014\nWorkqueue: mlx5_health0000:08:00.0 mlx5_fw_fatal_reporter_err_work [mlx5_core]\nCall Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n dump_stack_lvl+0x7e/0xc0\n kasan_report+0xb9/0xf0\n kasan_check_range+0xec/0x190\n mlx5_cmd_trigger_completions+0x1db/0x600 [mlx5_core]\n mlx5_cmd_flush+0x94/0x240 [mlx5_core]\n enter_error_state+0x6c/0xd0 [mlx5_core]\n mlx5_fw_fatal_reporter_err_work+0xf3/0x480 [mlx5_core]\n process_one_work+0x787/0x1490\n ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x400/0x400\n ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0xda0/0xda0\n ? assign_work+0x168/0x240\n worker_thread+0x586/0xd30\n ? rescuer_thread+0xae0/0xae0\n kthread+0x2df/0x3b0\n ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20\n ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x70\n ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20\n ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20\n \u003c/TASK\u003e",
"id": "AZL-53376",
"modified": "2025-01-18T06:34:06Z",
"published": "2024-11-07T10:15:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-50147"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "CVE-2024-50147 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.64.2-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2024-50147"
]
}
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