AZL-53450 (CVE-2024-50169)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2024-11-07 10:15 – Updated: 2025-01-18 06:34 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vsock: Update rx_bytes on read_skb()
Make sure virtio_transport_inc_rx_pkt() and virtio_transport_dec_rx_pkt() calls are balanced (i.e. virtio_vsock_sock::rx_bytes doesn't lie) after vsock_transport::read_skb().
While here, also inform the peer that we've freed up space and it has more credit.
Failing to update rx_bytes after packet is dequeued leads to a warning on SOCK_STREAM recv():
[ 233.396654] rx_queue is empty, but rx_bytes is non-zero [ 233.396702] WARNING: CPU: 11 PID: 40601 at net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c:589
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-50169 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: < 6.6.64.2-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.64.2-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nvsock: Update rx_bytes on read_skb()\n\nMake sure virtio_transport_inc_rx_pkt() and virtio_transport_dec_rx_pkt()\ncalls are balanced (i.e. virtio_vsock_sock::rx_bytes doesn\u0027t lie) after\nvsock_transport::read_skb().\n\nWhile here, also inform the peer that we\u0027ve freed up space and it has more\ncredit.\n\nFailing to update rx_bytes after packet is dequeued leads to a warning on\nSOCK_STREAM recv():\n\n[ 233.396654] rx_queue is empty, but rx_bytes is non-zero\n[ 233.396702] WARNING: CPU: 11 PID: 40601 at net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport_common.c:589",
"id": "AZL-53450",
"modified": "2025-01-18T06:34:06Z",
"published": "2024-11-07T10:15:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-50169"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "CVE-2024-50169 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.64.2-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2024-50169"
]
}
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