AZL-54165 (CVE-2024-53139)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2024-12-04 15:15 – Updated: 2025-01-18 06:34 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: fix possible UAF in sctp_v6_available()
A lockdep report [1] with CONFIG_PROVE_RCU_LIST=y hints that sctp_v6_available() is calling dev_get_by_index_rcu() and ipv6_chk_addr() without holding rcu.
[1] ============================= WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 6.12.0-rc5-virtme #1216 Tainted: G W
net/core/dev.c:876 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 1 lock held by sctp_hello/31495: #0: ffff9f1ebbdb7418 (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: sctp_bind (./arch/x86/include/asm/jump_label.h:27 net/sctp/socket.c:315) sctp
stack backtrace: CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 31495 Comm: sctp_hello Tainted: G W 6.12.0-rc5-virtme #1216 Tainted: [W]=WARN Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:123) lockdep_rcu_suspicious (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:6822) dev_get_by_index_rcu (net/core/dev.c:876 (discriminator 7)) sctp_v6_available (net/sctp/ipv6.c:701) sctp sctp_do_bind (net/sctp/socket.c:400 (discriminator 1)) sctp sctp_bind (net/sctp/socket.c:320) sctp inet6_bind_sk (net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:465) ? security_socket_bind (security/security.c:4581 (discriminator 1)) __sys_bind (net/socket.c:1848 net/socket.c:1869) ? do_user_addr_fault (./include/linux/rcupdate.h:347 ./include/linux/rcupdate.h:880 ./include/linux/mm.h:729 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1340) ? do_user_addr_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:84 (discriminator 13) ./include/linux/rcupdate.h:98 (discriminator 13) ./include/linux/rcupdate.h:882 (discriminator 13) ./include/linux/mm.h:729 (discriminator 13) arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1340 (discriminator 13)) __x64_sys_bind (net/socket.c:1877 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:1875 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:1875 (discriminator 1)) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 (discriminator 1) arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 (discriminator 1)) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130) RIP: 0033:0x7f59b934a1e7 Code: 44 00 00 48 8b 15 39 8c 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff eb bd 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 b8 31 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 09 8c 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 All code ======== 0: 44 00 00 add %r8b,(%rax) 3: 48 8b 15 39 8c 0c 00 mov 0xc8c39(%rip),%rdx # 0xc8c43 a: f7 d8 neg %eax c: 64 89 02 mov %eax,%fs:(%rdx) f: b8 ff ff ff ff mov $0xffffffff,%eax 14: eb bd jmp 0xffffffffffffffd3 16: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 cs nopw 0x0(%rax,%rax,1) 1d: 00 00 00 20: 0f 1f 00 nopl (%rax) 23: b8 31 00 00 00 mov $0x31,%eax 28: 0f 05 syscall 2a:* 48 3d 01 f0 ff ff cmp $0xfffffffffffff001,%rax <-- trapping instruction 30: 73 01 jae 0x33 32: c3 ret 33: 48 8b 0d 09 8c 0c 00 mov 0xc8c09(%rip),%rcx # 0xc8c43 3a: f7 d8 neg %eax 3c: 64 89 01 mov %eax,%fs:(%rcx) 3f: 48 rex.W
Code starting with the faulting instruction
0: 48 3d 01 f0 ff ff cmp $0xfffffffffffff001,%rax 6: 73 01 jae 0x9 8: c3 ret 9: 48 8b 0d 09 8c 0c 00 mov 0xc8c09(%rip),%rcx # 0xc8c19 10: f7 d8 neg %eax 12: 64 89 01 mov %eax,%fs:(%rcx) 15: 48 rex.W RSP: 002b:00007ffe2d0ad398 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000031 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffe2d0ad3d0 RCX: 00007f59b934a1e7 RDX: 000000000000001c RSI: 00007ffe2d0ad3d0 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 0000000000000005 R08: 1999999999999999 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00007f59b9253298 R11: 000000000000 ---truncated---
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-53139 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: < 6.6.64.2-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.64.2-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsctp: fix possible UAF in sctp_v6_available()\n\nA lockdep report [1] with CONFIG_PROVE_RCU_LIST=y hints\nthat sctp_v6_available() is calling dev_get_by_index_rcu()\nand ipv6_chk_addr() without holding rcu.\n\n[1]\n =============================\n WARNING: suspicious RCU usage\n 6.12.0-rc5-virtme #1216 Tainted: G W\n -----------------------------\n net/core/dev.c:876 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!\n\nother info that might help us debug this:\n\nrcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1\n 1 lock held by sctp_hello/31495:\n #0: ffff9f1ebbdb7418 (sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: sctp_bind (./arch/x86/include/asm/jump_label.h:27 net/sctp/socket.c:315) sctp\n\nstack backtrace:\n CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 31495 Comm: sctp_hello Tainted: G W 6.12.0-rc5-virtme #1216\n Tainted: [W]=WARN\n Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014\n Call Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:123)\n lockdep_rcu_suspicious (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:6822)\n dev_get_by_index_rcu (net/core/dev.c:876 (discriminator 7))\n sctp_v6_available (net/sctp/ipv6.c:701) sctp\n sctp_do_bind (net/sctp/socket.c:400 (discriminator 1)) sctp\n sctp_bind (net/sctp/socket.c:320) sctp\n inet6_bind_sk (net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:465)\n ? security_socket_bind (security/security.c:4581 (discriminator 1))\n __sys_bind (net/socket.c:1848 net/socket.c:1869)\n ? do_user_addr_fault (./include/linux/rcupdate.h:347 ./include/linux/rcupdate.h:880 ./include/linux/mm.h:729 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1340)\n ? do_user_addr_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:84 (discriminator 13) ./include/linux/rcupdate.h:98 (discriminator 13) ./include/linux/rcupdate.h:882 (discriminator 13) ./include/linux/mm.h:729 (discriminator 13) arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1340 (discriminator 13))\n __x64_sys_bind (net/socket.c:1877 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:1875 (discriminator 1) net/socket.c:1875 (discriminator 1))\n do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 (discriminator 1) arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 (discriminator 1))\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)\n RIP: 0033:0x7f59b934a1e7\n Code: 44 00 00 48 8b 15 39 8c 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff eb bd 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 b8 31 00 00 00 0f 05 \u003c48\u003e 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 09 8c 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48\nAll code\n========\n 0:\t44 00 00 \tadd %r8b,(%rax)\n 3:\t48 8b 15 39 8c 0c 00 \tmov 0xc8c39(%rip),%rdx # 0xc8c43\n a:\tf7 d8 \tneg %eax\n c:\t64 89 02 \tmov %eax,%fs:(%rdx)\n f:\tb8 ff ff ff ff \tmov $0xffffffff,%eax\n 14:\teb bd \tjmp 0xffffffffffffffd3\n 16:\t66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 \tcs nopw 0x0(%rax,%rax,1)\n 1d:\t00 00 00\n 20:\t0f 1f 00 \tnopl (%rax)\n 23:\tb8 31 00 00 00 \tmov $0x31,%eax\n 28:\t0f 05 \tsyscall\n 2a:*\t48 3d 01 f0 ff ff \tcmp $0xfffffffffffff001,%rax\t\t\u003c-- trapping instruction\n 30:\t73 01 \tjae 0x33\n 32:\tc3 \tret\n 33:\t48 8b 0d 09 8c 0c 00 \tmov 0xc8c09(%rip),%rcx # 0xc8c43\n 3a:\tf7 d8 \tneg %eax\n 3c:\t64 89 01 \tmov %eax,%fs:(%rcx)\n 3f:\t48 \trex.W\n\nCode starting with the faulting instruction\n===========================================\n 0:\t48 3d 01 f0 ff ff \tcmp $0xfffffffffffff001,%rax\n 6:\t73 01 \tjae 0x9\n 8:\tc3 \tret\n 9:\t48 8b 0d 09 8c 0c 00 \tmov 0xc8c09(%rip),%rcx # 0xc8c19\n 10:\tf7 d8 \tneg %eax\n 12:\t64 89 01 \tmov %eax,%fs:(%rcx)\n 15:\t48 \trex.W\n RSP: 002b:00007ffe2d0ad398 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000031\n RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffe2d0ad3d0 RCX: 00007f59b934a1e7\n RDX: 000000000000001c RSI: 00007ffe2d0ad3d0 RDI: 0000000000000005\n RBP: 0000000000000005 R08: 1999999999999999 R09: 0000000000000000\n R10: 00007f59b9253298 R11: 000000000000\n---truncated---",
"id": "AZL-54165",
"modified": "2025-01-18T06:34:06Z",
"published": "2024-12-04T15:15:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-53139"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "CVE-2024-53139 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.64.2-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2024-53139"
]
}
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