AZL-54735 (CVE-2024-56647)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2024-12-27 15:15 – Updated: 2026-03-10 17:42 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: Fix icmp host relookup triggering ip_rt_bug
arp link failure may trigger ip_rt_bug while xfrm enabled, call trace is:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at net/ipv4/route.c:1241 ip_rt_bug+0x14/0x20 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6-00077-g2e1b3cc9d7f7 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:ip_rt_bug+0x14/0x20 Call Trace: ip_send_skb+0x14/0x40 __icmp_send+0x42d/0x6a0 ipv4_link_failure+0xe2/0x1d0 arp_error_report+0x3c/0x50 neigh_invalidate+0x8d/0x100 neigh_timer_handler+0x2e1/0x330 call_timer_fn+0x21/0x120 __run_timer_base.part.0+0x1c9/0x270 run_timer_softirq+0x4c/0x80 handle_softirqs+0xac/0x280 irq_exit_rcu+0x62/0x80 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x77/0x90
The script below reproduces this scenario: ip xfrm policy add src 0.0.0.0/0 dst 0.0.0.0/0 \ dir out priority 0 ptype main flag localok icmp ip l a veth1 type veth ip a a 192.168.141.111/24 dev veth0 ip l s veth0 up ping 192.168.141.155 -c 1
icmp_route_lookup() create input routes for locally generated packets while xfrm relookup ICMP traffic.Then it will set input route (dst->out = ip_rt_bug) to skb for DESTUNREACH.
For ICMP err triggered by locally generated packets, dst->dev of output route is loopback. Generally, xfrm relookup verification is not required on loopback interfaces (net.ipv4.conf.lo.disable_xfrm = 1).
Skip icmp relookup for locally generated packets to fix it.
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-56647 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:2 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: ≤ 5.15.200.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:2",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "5.15.200.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: Fix icmp host relookup triggering ip_rt_bug\n\narp link failure may trigger ip_rt_bug while xfrm enabled, call trace is:\n\nWARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at net/ipv4/route.c:1241 ip_rt_bug+0x14/0x20\nModules linked in:\nCPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6-00077-g2e1b3cc9d7f7\nHardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996),\nBIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014\nRIP: 0010:ip_rt_bug+0x14/0x20\nCall Trace:\n \u003cIRQ\u003e\n ip_send_skb+0x14/0x40\n __icmp_send+0x42d/0x6a0\n ipv4_link_failure+0xe2/0x1d0\n arp_error_report+0x3c/0x50\n neigh_invalidate+0x8d/0x100\n neigh_timer_handler+0x2e1/0x330\n call_timer_fn+0x21/0x120\n __run_timer_base.part.0+0x1c9/0x270\n run_timer_softirq+0x4c/0x80\n handle_softirqs+0xac/0x280\n irq_exit_rcu+0x62/0x80\n sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x77/0x90\n\nThe script below reproduces this scenario:\nip xfrm policy add src 0.0.0.0/0 dst 0.0.0.0/0 \\\n\tdir out priority 0 ptype main flag localok icmp\nip l a veth1 type veth\nip a a 192.168.141.111/24 dev veth0\nip l s veth0 up\nping 192.168.141.155 -c 1\n\nicmp_route_lookup() create input routes for locally generated packets\nwhile xfrm relookup ICMP traffic.Then it will set input route\n(dst-\u003eout = ip_rt_bug) to skb for DESTUNREACH.\n\nFor ICMP err triggered by locally generated packets, dst-\u003edev of output\nroute is loopback. Generally, xfrm relookup verification is not required\non loopback interfaces (net.ipv4.conf.lo.disable_xfrm = 1).\n\nSkip icmp relookup for locally generated packets to fix it.",
"id": "AZL-54735",
"modified": "2026-03-10T17:42:31Z",
"published": "2024-12-27T15:15:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-56647"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "CVE-2024-56647 affecting package kernel 5.15.200.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2024-56647"
]
}
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