AZL-54875 (CVE-2024-56653)

Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2024-12-27 15:15 – Updated: 2025-02-27 19:09 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
CVE-2024-56653 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.76.1-1
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: btmtk: avoid UAF in btmtk_process_coredump

hci_devcd_append may lead to the release of the skb, so it cannot be accessed once it is called.

================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in btmtk_process_coredump+0x2a7/0x2d0 [btmtk] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888033cfabb0 by task kworker/0:3/82

CPU: 0 PID: 82 Comm: kworker/0:3 Tainted: G U 6.6.40-lockdep-03464-g1d8b4eb3060e #1 b0b3c1cc0c842735643fb411799d97921d1f688c Hardware name: Google Yaviks_Ufs/Yaviks_Ufs, BIOS Google_Yaviks_Ufs.15217.552.0 05/07/2024 Workqueue: events btusb_rx_work [btusb] Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0xfd/0x150 print_report+0x131/0x780 kasan_report+0x177/0x1c0 btmtk_process_coredump+0x2a7/0x2d0 [btmtk 03edd567dd71a65958807c95a65db31d433e1d01] btusb_recv_acl_mtk+0x11c/0x1a0 [btusb 675430d1e87c4f24d0c1f80efe600757a0f32bec] btusb_rx_work+0x9e/0xe0 [btusb 675430d1e87c4f24d0c1f80efe600757a0f32bec] worker_thread+0xe44/0x2cc0 kthread+0x2ff/0x3a0 ret_from_fork+0x51/0x80 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30

Allocated by task 82: stack_trace_save+0xdc/0x190 kasan_set_track+0x4e/0x80 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x4e/0x60 kmem_cache_alloc+0x19f/0x360 skb_clone+0x132/0xf70 btusb_recv_acl_mtk+0x104/0x1a0 [btusb] btusb_rx_work+0x9e/0xe0 [btusb] worker_thread+0xe44/0x2cc0 kthread+0x2ff/0x3a0 ret_from_fork+0x51/0x80 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30

Freed by task 1733: stack_trace_save+0xdc/0x190 kasan_set_track+0x4e/0x80 kasan_save_free_info+0x28/0xb0 ____kasan_slab_free+0xfd/0x170 kmem_cache_free+0x183/0x3f0 hci_devcd_rx+0x91a/0x2060 [bluetooth] worker_thread+0xe44/0x2cc0 kthread+0x2ff/0x3a0 ret_from_fork+0x51/0x80 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888033cfab40 which belongs to the cache skbuff_head_cache of size 232 The buggy address is located 112 bytes inside of freed 232-byte region [ffff888033cfab40, ffff888033cfac28)

The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:00000000a174ba93 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x33cfa head:00000000a174ba93 order:1 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0 anon flags: 0x4000000000000840(slab|head|zone=1) page_type: 0xffffffff() raw: 4000000000000840 ffff888100848a00 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080190019 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888033cfaa80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc ffff888033cfab00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb

ffff888033cfab80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff888033cfac00: fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff888033cfac80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ==================================================================

Check if we need to call hci_devcd_complete before calling hci_devcd_append. That requires that we check data->cd_info.cnt >= MTK_COREDUMP_NUM instead of data->cd_info.cnt > MTK_COREDUMP_NUM, as we increment data->cd_info.cnt only once the call to hci_devcd_append succeeds.

Upstream
References
Impacted products
Ecosystem Package Version
Azure Linux:3 kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
Affected: < 6.6.76.1-1 (ecosystem)

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
        "name": "kernel",
        "purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.6.76.1-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: btmtk: avoid UAF in btmtk_process_coredump\n\nhci_devcd_append may lead to the release of the skb, so it cannot be\naccessed once it is called.\n\n==================================================================\nBUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in btmtk_process_coredump+0x2a7/0x2d0 [btmtk]\nRead of size 4 at addr ffff888033cfabb0 by task kworker/0:3/82\n\nCPU: 0 PID: 82 Comm: kworker/0:3 Tainted: G     U             6.6.40-lockdep-03464-g1d8b4eb3060e #1 b0b3c1cc0c842735643fb411799d97921d1f688c\nHardware name: Google Yaviks_Ufs/Yaviks_Ufs, BIOS Google_Yaviks_Ufs.15217.552.0 05/07/2024\nWorkqueue: events btusb_rx_work [btusb]\nCall Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n dump_stack_lvl+0xfd/0x150\n print_report+0x131/0x780\n kasan_report+0x177/0x1c0\n btmtk_process_coredump+0x2a7/0x2d0 [btmtk 03edd567dd71a65958807c95a65db31d433e1d01]\n btusb_recv_acl_mtk+0x11c/0x1a0 [btusb 675430d1e87c4f24d0c1f80efe600757a0f32bec]\n btusb_rx_work+0x9e/0xe0 [btusb 675430d1e87c4f24d0c1f80efe600757a0f32bec]\n worker_thread+0xe44/0x2cc0\n kthread+0x2ff/0x3a0\n ret_from_fork+0x51/0x80\n ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30\n \u003c/TASK\u003e\n\nAllocated by task 82:\n stack_trace_save+0xdc/0x190\n kasan_set_track+0x4e/0x80\n __kasan_slab_alloc+0x4e/0x60\n kmem_cache_alloc+0x19f/0x360\n skb_clone+0x132/0xf70\n btusb_recv_acl_mtk+0x104/0x1a0 [btusb]\n btusb_rx_work+0x9e/0xe0 [btusb]\n worker_thread+0xe44/0x2cc0\n kthread+0x2ff/0x3a0\n ret_from_fork+0x51/0x80\n ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30\n\nFreed by task 1733:\n stack_trace_save+0xdc/0x190\n kasan_set_track+0x4e/0x80\n kasan_save_free_info+0x28/0xb0\n ____kasan_slab_free+0xfd/0x170\n kmem_cache_free+0x183/0x3f0\n hci_devcd_rx+0x91a/0x2060 [bluetooth]\n worker_thread+0xe44/0x2cc0\n kthread+0x2ff/0x3a0\n ret_from_fork+0x51/0x80\n ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30\n\nThe buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888033cfab40\n which belongs to the cache skbuff_head_cache of size 232\nThe buggy address is located 112 bytes inside of\n freed 232-byte region [ffff888033cfab40, ffff888033cfac28)\n\nThe buggy address belongs to the physical page:\npage:00000000a174ba93 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x33cfa\nhead:00000000a174ba93 order:1 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0\nanon flags: 0x4000000000000840(slab|head|zone=1)\npage_type: 0xffffffff()\nraw: 4000000000000840 ffff888100848a00 0000000000000000 0000000000000001\nraw: 0000000000000000 0000000080190019 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000\npage dumped because: kasan: bad access detected\n\nMemory state around the buggy address:\n ffff888033cfaa80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc\n ffff888033cfab00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb\n\u003effff888033cfab80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb\n                                     ^\n ffff888033cfac00: fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc\n ffff888033cfac80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb\n==================================================================\n\nCheck if we need to call hci_devcd_complete before calling\nhci_devcd_append. That requires that we check data-\u003ecd_info.cnt \u003e=\nMTK_COREDUMP_NUM instead of data-\u003ecd_info.cnt \u003e MTK_COREDUMP_NUM, as we\nincrement data-\u003ecd_info.cnt only once the call to hci_devcd_append\nsucceeds.",
  "id": "AZL-54875",
  "modified": "2025-02-27T19:09:19Z",
  "published": "2024-12-27T15:15:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-56653"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.4",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "CVE-2024-56653 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.76.1-1",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2024-56653"
  ]
}



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