AZL-55395 (CVE-2024-56718)

Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2024-12-29 09:15 – Updated: 2026-03-10 17:42 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
CVE-2024-56718 affecting package kernel 5.15.200.1-1
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/smc: protect link down work from execute after lgr freed

link down work may be scheduled before lgr freed but execute after lgr freed, which may result in crash. So it is need to hold a reference before shedule link down work, and put the reference after work executed or canceled.

The relevant crash call stack as follows: list_del corruption. prev->next should be ffffb638c9c0fe20, but was 0000000000000000 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:51! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 6 PID: 978112 Comm: kworker/6:119 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G #1 Hardware name: Alibaba Cloud Alibaba Cloud ECS, BIOS 2221b89 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events smc_link_down_work [smc] RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid.cold+0x31/0x47 RSP: 0018:ffffb638c9c0fdd8 EFLAGS: 00010086 RAX: 0000000000000054 RBX: ffff942fb75e5128 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff943520930aa0 RSI: ffff94352091fc80 RDI: ffff94352091fc80 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffb638c9c0fc38 R10: ffffb638c9c0fc30 R11: ffffffffa015eb28 R12: 0000000000000002 R13: ffffb638c9c0fe20 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffff942f9cd051c0 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff943520900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f4f25214000 CR3: 000000025fbae004 CR4: 00000000007706e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: rwsem_down_write_slowpath+0x17e/0x470 smc_link_down_work+0x3c/0x60 [smc] process_one_work+0x1ac/0x350 worker_thread+0x49/0x2f0 ? rescuer_thread+0x360/0x360 kthread+0x118/0x140 ? __kthread_bind_mask+0x60/0x60 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

Upstream
References
Impacted products
Ecosystem Package Version
Azure Linux:2 kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
Affected: ≤ 5.15.200.1-1 (ecosystem)

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Azure Linux:2",
        "name": "kernel",
        "purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "5.15.200.1-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/smc: protect link down work from execute after lgr freed\n\nlink down work may be scheduled before lgr freed but execute\nafter lgr freed, which may result in crash. So it is need to\nhold a reference before shedule link down work, and put the\nreference after work executed or canceled.\n\nThe relevant crash call stack as follows:\n list_del corruption. prev-\u003enext should be ffffb638c9c0fe20,\n    but was 0000000000000000\n ------------[ cut here ]------------\n kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:51!\n invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI\n CPU: 6 PID: 978112 Comm: kworker/6:119 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G #1\n Hardware name: Alibaba Cloud Alibaba Cloud ECS, BIOS 2221b89 04/01/2014\n Workqueue: events smc_link_down_work [smc]\n RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid.cold+0x31/0x47\n RSP: 0018:ffffb638c9c0fdd8 EFLAGS: 00010086\n RAX: 0000000000000054 RBX: ffff942fb75e5128 RCX: 0000000000000000\n RDX: ffff943520930aa0 RSI: ffff94352091fc80 RDI: ffff94352091fc80\n RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffb638c9c0fc38\n R10: ffffb638c9c0fc30 R11: ffffffffa015eb28 R12: 0000000000000002\n R13: ffffb638c9c0fe20 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffff942f9cd051c0\n FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff943520900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\n CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\n CR2: 00007f4f25214000 CR3: 000000025fbae004 CR4: 00000000007706e0\n DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000\n DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400\n PKRU: 55555554\n Call Trace:\n  rwsem_down_write_slowpath+0x17e/0x470\n  smc_link_down_work+0x3c/0x60 [smc]\n  process_one_work+0x1ac/0x350\n  worker_thread+0x49/0x2f0\n  ? rescuer_thread+0x360/0x360\n  kthread+0x118/0x140\n  ? __kthread_bind_mask+0x60/0x60\n  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30",
  "id": "AZL-55395",
  "modified": "2026-03-10T17:42:31Z",
  "published": "2024-12-29T09:15:07Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-56718"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.4",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "CVE-2024-56718 affecting package kernel 5.15.200.1-1",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2024-56718"
  ]
}



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