AZL-55739 (CVE-2024-56692)

Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2024-12-28 10:15 – Updated: 2025-01-18 06:34 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
CVE-2024-56692 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.64.2-1
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

f2fs: fix to do sanity check on node blkaddr in truncate_node()

syzbot reports a f2fs bug as below:

------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/segment.c:2534! RIP: 0010:f2fs_invalidate_blocks+0x35f/0x370 fs/f2fs/segment.c:2534 Call Trace: truncate_node+0x1ae/0x8c0 fs/f2fs/node.c:909 f2fs_remove_inode_page+0x5c2/0x870 fs/f2fs/node.c:1288 f2fs_evict_inode+0x879/0x15c0 fs/f2fs/inode.c:856 evict+0x4e8/0x9b0 fs/inode.c:723 f2fs_handle_failed_inode+0x271/0x2e0 fs/f2fs/inode.c:986 f2fs_create+0x357/0x530 fs/f2fs/namei.c:394 lookup_open fs/namei.c:3595 [inline] open_last_lookups fs/namei.c:3694 [inline] path_openat+0x1c03/0x3590 fs/namei.c:3930 do_filp_open+0x235/0x490 fs/namei.c:3960 do_sys_openat2+0x13e/0x1d0 fs/open.c:1415 do_sys_open fs/open.c:1430 [inline] __do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1446 [inline] __se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1441 [inline] __x64_sys_openat+0x247/0x2a0 fs/open.c:1441 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0010:f2fs_invalidate_blocks+0x35f/0x370 fs/f2fs/segment.c:2534

The root cause is: on a fuzzed image, blkaddr in nat entry may be corrupted, then it will cause system panic when using it in f2fs_invalidate_blocks(), to avoid this, let's add sanity check on nat blkaddr in truncate_node().

Upstream
References
Impacted products
Ecosystem Package Version
Azure Linux:3 kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
Affected: < 6.6.64.2-1 (ecosystem)

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
        "name": "kernel",
        "purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.6.64.2-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nf2fs: fix to do sanity check on node blkaddr in truncate_node()\n\nsyzbot reports a f2fs bug as below:\n\n------------[ cut here ]------------\nkernel BUG at fs/f2fs/segment.c:2534!\nRIP: 0010:f2fs_invalidate_blocks+0x35f/0x370 fs/f2fs/segment.c:2534\nCall Trace:\n truncate_node+0x1ae/0x8c0 fs/f2fs/node.c:909\n f2fs_remove_inode_page+0x5c2/0x870 fs/f2fs/node.c:1288\n f2fs_evict_inode+0x879/0x15c0 fs/f2fs/inode.c:856\n evict+0x4e8/0x9b0 fs/inode.c:723\n f2fs_handle_failed_inode+0x271/0x2e0 fs/f2fs/inode.c:986\n f2fs_create+0x357/0x530 fs/f2fs/namei.c:394\n lookup_open fs/namei.c:3595 [inline]\n open_last_lookups fs/namei.c:3694 [inline]\n path_openat+0x1c03/0x3590 fs/namei.c:3930\n do_filp_open+0x235/0x490 fs/namei.c:3960\n do_sys_openat2+0x13e/0x1d0 fs/open.c:1415\n do_sys_open fs/open.c:1430 [inline]\n __do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1446 [inline]\n __se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1441 [inline]\n __x64_sys_openat+0x247/0x2a0 fs/open.c:1441\n do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]\n do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f\nRIP: 0010:f2fs_invalidate_blocks+0x35f/0x370 fs/f2fs/segment.c:2534\n\nThe root cause is: on a fuzzed image, blkaddr in nat entry may be\ncorrupted, then it will cause system panic when using it in\nf2fs_invalidate_blocks(), to avoid this, let\u0027s add sanity check on\nnat blkaddr in truncate_node().",
  "id": "AZL-55739",
  "modified": "2025-01-18T06:34:06Z",
  "published": "2024-12-28T10:15:14Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-56692"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.4",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "CVE-2024-56692 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.64.2-1",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2024-56692"
  ]
}



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