AZL-56250 (CVE-2024-56544)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2024-12-27 14:15 – Updated: 2026-03-10 17:42 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
udmabuf: change folios array from kmalloc to kvmalloc
When PAGE_SIZE 4096, MAX_PAGE_ORDER 10, 64bit machine, page_alloc only support 4MB. If above this, trigger this warn and return NULL.
udmabuf can change size limit, if change it to 3072(3GB), and then alloc 3GB udmabuf, will fail create.
[ 4080.876581] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 4080.876843] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 2015 at mm/page_alloc.c:4556 __alloc_pages+0x2c8/0x350 [ 4080.878839] RIP: 0010:__alloc_pages+0x2c8/0x350 [ 4080.879470] Call Trace: [ 4080.879473] [ 4080.879473] ? __alloc_pages+0x2c8/0x350 [ 4080.879475] ? __warn.cold+0x8e/0xe8 [ 4080.880647] ? __alloc_pages+0x2c8/0x350 [ 4080.880909] ? report_bug+0xff/0x140 [ 4080.881175] ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80 [ 4080.881556] ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70 [ 4080.881559] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 [ 4080.882077] ? udmabuf_create+0x131/0x400
Because MAX_PAGE_ORDER, kmalloc can max alloc 4096 * (1 << 10), 4MB memory, each array entry is pointer(8byte), so can save 524288 pages(2GB).
Further more, costly order(order 3) may not be guaranteed that it can be applied for, due to fragmentation.
This patch change udmabuf array use kvmalloc_array, this can fallback alloc into vmalloc, which can guarantee allocation for any size and does not affect the performance of kmalloc allocations.
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-56544 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:2 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: ≤ 5.15.200.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:2",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "5.15.200.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nudmabuf: change folios array from kmalloc to kvmalloc\n\nWhen PAGE_SIZE 4096, MAX_PAGE_ORDER 10, 64bit machine,\npage_alloc only support 4MB.\nIf above this, trigger this warn and return NULL.\n\nudmabuf can change size limit, if change it to 3072(3GB), and then alloc\n3GB udmabuf, will fail create.\n\n[ 4080.876581] ------------[ cut here ]------------\n[ 4080.876843] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 2015 at mm/page_alloc.c:4556 __alloc_pages+0x2c8/0x350\n[ 4080.878839] RIP: 0010:__alloc_pages+0x2c8/0x350\n[ 4080.879470] Call Trace:\n[ 4080.879473] \u003cTASK\u003e\n[ 4080.879473] ? __alloc_pages+0x2c8/0x350\n[ 4080.879475] ? __warn.cold+0x8e/0xe8\n[ 4080.880647] ? __alloc_pages+0x2c8/0x350\n[ 4080.880909] ? report_bug+0xff/0x140\n[ 4080.881175] ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80\n[ 4080.881556] ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70\n[ 4080.881559] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20\n[ 4080.882077] ? udmabuf_create+0x131/0x400\n\nBecause MAX_PAGE_ORDER, kmalloc can max alloc 4096 * (1 \u003c\u003c 10), 4MB\nmemory, each array entry is pointer(8byte), so can save 524288 pages(2GB).\n\nFurther more, costly order(order 3) may not be guaranteed that it can be\napplied for, due to fragmentation.\n\nThis patch change udmabuf array use kvmalloc_array, this can fallback\nalloc into vmalloc, which can guarantee allocation for any size and does\nnot affect the performance of kmalloc allocations.",
"id": "AZL-56250",
"modified": "2026-03-10T17:42:31Z",
"published": "2024-12-27T14:15:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-56544"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "CVE-2024-56544 affecting package kernel 5.15.200.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2024-56544"
]
}
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