AZL-58045 (CVE-2022-49728)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2025-02-26 07:01 – Updated: 2026-03-10 17:42 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: Fix signed integer overflow in __ip6_append_data
Resurrect ubsan overflow checks and ubsan report this warning, fix it by change the variable [length] type to size_t.
UBSAN: signed-integer-overflow in net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1489:19 2147479552 + 8567 cannot be represented in type 'int' CPU: 0 PID: 253 Comm: err Not tainted 5.16.0+ #1 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x214/0x230 show_stack+0x30/0x78 dump_stack_lvl+0xf8/0x118 dump_stack+0x18/0x30 ubsan_epilogue+0x18/0x60 handle_overflow+0xd0/0xf0 __ubsan_handle_add_overflow+0x34/0x44 __ip6_append_data.isra.48+0x1598/0x1688 ip6_append_data+0x128/0x260 udpv6_sendmsg+0x680/0xdd0 inet6_sendmsg+0x54/0x90 sock_sendmsg+0x70/0x88 ____sys_sendmsg+0xe8/0x368 ___sys_sendmsg+0x98/0xe0 __sys_sendmmsg+0xf4/0x3b8 __arm64_sys_sendmmsg+0x34/0x48 invoke_syscall+0x64/0x160 el0_svc_common.constprop.4+0x124/0x300 do_el0_svc+0x44/0xc8 el0_svc+0x3c/0x1e8 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x88/0xb0 el0t_64_sync+0x16c/0x170
Changes since v1: -Change the variable [length] type to unsigned, as Eric Dumazet suggested. Changes since v2: -Don't change exthdrlen type in ip6_make_skb, as Paolo Abeni suggested. Changes since v3: -Don't change ulen type in udpv6_sendmsg and l2tp_ip6_sendmsg, as Jakub Kicinski suggested.
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-49728 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:2 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: < 5.15.180.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:2",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.15.180.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nipv6: Fix signed integer overflow in __ip6_append_data\n\nResurrect ubsan overflow checks and ubsan report this warning,\nfix it by change the variable [length] type to size_t.\n\nUBSAN: signed-integer-overflow in net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1489:19\n2147479552 + 8567 cannot be represented in type \u0027int\u0027\nCPU: 0 PID: 253 Comm: err Not tainted 5.16.0+ #1\nHardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)\nCall trace:\n dump_backtrace+0x214/0x230\n show_stack+0x30/0x78\n dump_stack_lvl+0xf8/0x118\n dump_stack+0x18/0x30\n ubsan_epilogue+0x18/0x60\n handle_overflow+0xd0/0xf0\n __ubsan_handle_add_overflow+0x34/0x44\n __ip6_append_data.isra.48+0x1598/0x1688\n ip6_append_data+0x128/0x260\n udpv6_sendmsg+0x680/0xdd0\n inet6_sendmsg+0x54/0x90\n sock_sendmsg+0x70/0x88\n ____sys_sendmsg+0xe8/0x368\n ___sys_sendmsg+0x98/0xe0\n __sys_sendmmsg+0xf4/0x3b8\n __arm64_sys_sendmmsg+0x34/0x48\n invoke_syscall+0x64/0x160\n el0_svc_common.constprop.4+0x124/0x300\n do_el0_svc+0x44/0xc8\n el0_svc+0x3c/0x1e8\n el0t_64_sync_handler+0x88/0xb0\n el0t_64_sync+0x16c/0x170\n\nChanges since v1:\n-Change the variable [length] type to unsigned, as Eric Dumazet suggested.\nChanges since v2:\n-Don\u0027t change exthdrlen type in ip6_make_skb, as Paolo Abeni suggested.\nChanges since v3:\n-Don\u0027t change ulen type in udpv6_sendmsg and l2tp_ip6_sendmsg, as\nJakub Kicinski suggested.",
"id": "AZL-58045",
"modified": "2026-03-10T17:42:31Z",
"published": "2025-02-26T07:01:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-49728"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "CVE-2022-49728 affecting package kernel for versions less than 5.15.180.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2022-49728"
]
}
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