AZL-58511 (CVE-2025-21857)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2025-03-12 10:15 – Updated: 2025-04-02 05:48 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: cls_api: fix error handling causing NULL dereference
tcf_exts_miss_cookie_base_alloc() calls xa_alloc_cyclic() which can return 1 if the allocation succeeded after wrapping. This was treated as an error, with value 1 returned to caller tcf_exts_init_ex() which sets exts->actions to NULL and returns 1 to caller fl_change().
fl_change() treats err == 1 as success, calling tcf_exts_validate_ex() which calls tcf_action_init() with exts->actions as argument, where it is dereferenced.
Example trace:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 CPU: 114 PID: 16151 Comm: handler114 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.14.0-503.16.1.el9_5.x86_64 #1 RIP: 0010:tcf_action_init+0x1f8/0x2c0 Call Trace: tcf_action_init+0x1f8/0x2c0 tcf_exts_validate_ex+0x175/0x190 fl_change+0x537/0x1120 [cls_flower]
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-21857 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: < 6.6.82.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.82.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/sched: cls_api: fix error handling causing NULL dereference\n\ntcf_exts_miss_cookie_base_alloc() calls xa_alloc_cyclic() which can\nreturn 1 if the allocation succeeded after wrapping. This was treated as\nan error, with value 1 returned to caller tcf_exts_init_ex() which sets\nexts-\u003eactions to NULL and returns 1 to caller fl_change().\n\nfl_change() treats err == 1 as success, calling tcf_exts_validate_ex()\nwhich calls tcf_action_init() with exts-\u003eactions as argument, where it\nis dereferenced.\n\nExample trace:\n\nBUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000\nCPU: 114 PID: 16151 Comm: handler114 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.14.0-503.16.1.el9_5.x86_64 #1\nRIP: 0010:tcf_action_init+0x1f8/0x2c0\nCall Trace:\n tcf_action_init+0x1f8/0x2c0\n tcf_exts_validate_ex+0x175/0x190\n fl_change+0x537/0x1120 [cls_flower]",
"id": "AZL-58511",
"modified": "2025-04-02T05:48:05Z",
"published": "2025-03-12T10:15:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-21857"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "CVE-2025-21857 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.82.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2025-21857"
]
}
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|---|
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