AZL-59031 (CVE-2024-53216)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2024-12-27 14:15 – Updated: 2026-03-10 17:42 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: release svc_expkey/svc_export with rcu_work
The last reference for cache_head can be reduced to zero in c_show
and e_show(using rcu_read_lock and rcu_read_unlock). Consequently,
svc_export_put and expkey_put will be invoked, leading to two
issues:
- The
svc_export_putwill directly free ex_uuid. However,e_show/c_showwill accessex_uuidaftercache_put, which can trigger a use-after-free issue, shown below.
================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in svc_export_show+0x362/0x430 [nfsd] Read of size 1 at addr ff11000010fdc120 by task cat/870
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 870 Comm: cat Not tainted 6.12.0-rc3+ #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.1-2.fc37 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x3a0 print_report+0xb9/0x280 kasan_report+0xae/0xe0 svc_export_show+0x362/0x430 [nfsd] c_show+0x161/0x390 [sunrpc] seq_read_iter+0x589/0x770 seq_read+0x1e5/0x270 proc_reg_read+0xe1/0x140 vfs_read+0x125/0x530 ksys_read+0xc1/0x160 do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
Allocated by task 830: kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0x8f/0xa0 __kmalloc_node_track_caller_noprof+0x1bc/0x400 kmemdup_noprof+0x22/0x50 svc_export_parse+0x8a9/0xb80 [nfsd] cache_do_downcall+0x71/0xa0 [sunrpc] cache_write_procfs+0x8e/0xd0 [sunrpc] proc_reg_write+0xe1/0x140 vfs_write+0x1a5/0x6d0 ksys_write+0xc1/0x160 do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
Freed by task 868: kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 __kasan_slab_free+0x37/0x50 kfree+0xf3/0x3e0 svc_export_put+0x87/0xb0 [nfsd] cache_purge+0x17f/0x1f0 [sunrpc] nfsd_destroy_serv+0x226/0x2d0 [nfsd] nfsd_svc+0x125/0x1e0 [nfsd] write_threads+0x16a/0x2a0 [nfsd] nfsctl_transaction_write+0x74/0xa0 [nfsd] vfs_write+0x1a5/0x6d0 ksys_write+0xc1/0x160 do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
- We cannot sleep while using
rcu_read_lock/rcu_read_unlock. However,svc_export_put/expkey_putwill call path_put, which subsequently triggers a sleeping operation due to the followingdput.
============================= WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 5.10.0-dirty #141 Not tainted
... Call Trace: dump_stack+0x9a/0xd0 ___might_sleep+0x231/0x240 dput+0x39/0x600 path_put+0x1b/0x30 svc_export_put+0x17/0x80 e_show+0x1c9/0x200 seq_read_iter+0x63f/0x7c0 seq_read+0x226/0x2d0 vfs_read+0x113/0x2c0 ksys_read+0xc9/0x170 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0xd1
Fix these issues by using rcu_work to help release
svc_expkey/svc_export. This approach allows for an asynchronous
context to invoke path_put and also facilitates the freeing of
uuid/exp/key after an RCU grace period.
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-53216 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:2 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: ≤ 5.15.200.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:2",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "5.15.200.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnfsd: release svc_expkey/svc_export with rcu_work\n\nThe last reference for `cache_head` can be reduced to zero in `c_show`\nand `e_show`(using `rcu_read_lock` and `rcu_read_unlock`). Consequently,\n`svc_export_put` and `expkey_put` will be invoked, leading to two\nissues:\n\n1. The `svc_export_put` will directly free ex_uuid. However,\n `e_show`/`c_show` will access `ex_uuid` after `cache_put`, which can\n trigger a use-after-free issue, shown below.\n\n ==================================================================\n BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in svc_export_show+0x362/0x430 [nfsd]\n Read of size 1 at addr ff11000010fdc120 by task cat/870\n\n CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 870 Comm: cat Not tainted 6.12.0-rc3+ #1\n Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS\n 1.16.1-2.fc37 04/01/2014\n Call Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70\n print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x3a0\n print_report+0xb9/0x280\n kasan_report+0xae/0xe0\n svc_export_show+0x362/0x430 [nfsd]\n c_show+0x161/0x390 [sunrpc]\n seq_read_iter+0x589/0x770\n seq_read+0x1e5/0x270\n proc_reg_read+0xe1/0x140\n vfs_read+0x125/0x530\n ksys_read+0xc1/0x160\n do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x170\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\n\n Allocated by task 830:\n kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40\n kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30\n __kasan_kmalloc+0x8f/0xa0\n __kmalloc_node_track_caller_noprof+0x1bc/0x400\n kmemdup_noprof+0x22/0x50\n svc_export_parse+0x8a9/0xb80 [nfsd]\n cache_do_downcall+0x71/0xa0 [sunrpc]\n cache_write_procfs+0x8e/0xd0 [sunrpc]\n proc_reg_write+0xe1/0x140\n vfs_write+0x1a5/0x6d0\n ksys_write+0xc1/0x160\n do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x170\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\n\n Freed by task 868:\n kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40\n kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30\n kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60\n __kasan_slab_free+0x37/0x50\n kfree+0xf3/0x3e0\n svc_export_put+0x87/0xb0 [nfsd]\n cache_purge+0x17f/0x1f0 [sunrpc]\n nfsd_destroy_serv+0x226/0x2d0 [nfsd]\n nfsd_svc+0x125/0x1e0 [nfsd]\n write_threads+0x16a/0x2a0 [nfsd]\n nfsctl_transaction_write+0x74/0xa0 [nfsd]\n vfs_write+0x1a5/0x6d0\n ksys_write+0xc1/0x160\n do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x170\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\n\n2. We cannot sleep while using `rcu_read_lock`/`rcu_read_unlock`.\n However, `svc_export_put`/`expkey_put` will call path_put, which\n subsequently triggers a sleeping operation due to the following\n `dput`.\n\n =============================\n WARNING: suspicious RCU usage\n 5.10.0-dirty #141 Not tainted\n -----------------------------\n ...\n Call Trace:\n dump_stack+0x9a/0xd0\n ___might_sleep+0x231/0x240\n dput+0x39/0x600\n path_put+0x1b/0x30\n svc_export_put+0x17/0x80\n e_show+0x1c9/0x200\n seq_read_iter+0x63f/0x7c0\n seq_read+0x226/0x2d0\n vfs_read+0x113/0x2c0\n ksys_read+0xc9/0x170\n do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0xd1\n\nFix these issues by using `rcu_work` to help release\n`svc_expkey`/`svc_export`. This approach allows for an asynchronous\ncontext to invoke `path_put` and also facilitates the freeing of\n`uuid/exp/key` after an RCU grace period.",
"id": "AZL-59031",
"modified": "2026-03-10T17:42:31Z",
"published": "2024-12-27T14:15:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-53216"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "CVE-2024-53216 affecting package kernel 5.15.200.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2024-53216"
]
}
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