AZL-66830 (CVE-2025-38730)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2025-09-04 16:15 – Updated: 2025-10-22 07:04 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/net: commit partial buffers on retry
Ring provided buffers are potentially only valid within the single execution context in which they were acquired. io_uring deals with this and invalidates them on retry. But on the networking side, if MSG_WAITALL is set, or if the socket is of the streaming type and too little was processed, then it will hang on to the buffer rather than recycle or commit it. This is problematic for two reasons:
1) If someone unregisters the provided buffer ring before a later retry, then the req->buf_list will no longer be valid.
2) If multiple sockers are using the same buffer group, then multiple receives can consume the same memory. This can cause data corruption in the application, as either receive could land in the same userspace buffer.
Fix this by disallowing partial retries from pinning a provided buffer across multiple executions, if ring provided buffers are used.
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38730 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: < 6.6.104.2-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.104.2-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nio_uring/net: commit partial buffers on retry\n\nRing provided buffers are potentially only valid within the single\nexecution context in which they were acquired. io_uring deals with this\nand invalidates them on retry. But on the networking side, if\nMSG_WAITALL is set, or if the socket is of the streaming type and too\nlittle was processed, then it will hang on to the buffer rather than\nrecycle or commit it. This is problematic for two reasons:\n\n1) If someone unregisters the provided buffer ring before a later retry,\n then the req-\u003ebuf_list will no longer be valid.\n\n2) If multiple sockers are using the same buffer group, then multiple\n receives can consume the same memory. This can cause data corruption\n in the application, as either receive could land in the same\n userspace buffer.\n\nFix this by disallowing partial retries from pinning a provided buffer\nacross multiple executions, if ring provided buffers are used.",
"id": "AZL-66830",
"modified": "2025-10-22T07:04:28Z",
"published": "2025-09-04T16:15:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38730"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "CVE-2025-38730 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.104.2-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2025-38730"
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.