AZL-66962 (CVE-2025-39689)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2025-09-05 18:15 – Updated: 2025-10-22 07:04 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ftrace: Also allocate and copy hash for reading of filter files
Currently the reader of set_ftrace_filter and set_ftrace_notrace just adds the pointer to the global tracer hash to its iterator. Unlike the writer that allocates a copy of the hash, the reader keeps the pointer to the filter hashes. This is problematic because this pointer is static across function calls that release the locks that can update the global tracer hashes. This can cause UAF and similar bugs.
Allocate and copy the hash for reading the filter files like it is done for the writers. This not only fixes UAF bugs, but also makes the code a bit simpler as it doesn't have to differentiate when to free the iterator's hash between writers and readers.
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39689 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: < 6.6.104.2-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.104.2-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nftrace: Also allocate and copy hash for reading of filter files\n\nCurrently the reader of set_ftrace_filter and set_ftrace_notrace just adds\nthe pointer to the global tracer hash to its iterator. Unlike the writer\nthat allocates a copy of the hash, the reader keeps the pointer to the\nfilter hashes. This is problematic because this pointer is static across\nfunction calls that release the locks that can update the global tracer\nhashes. This can cause UAF and similar bugs.\n\nAllocate and copy the hash for reading the filter files like it is done\nfor the writers. This not only fixes UAF bugs, but also makes the code a\nbit simpler as it doesn\u0027t have to differentiate when to free the\niterator\u0027s hash between writers and readers.",
"id": "AZL-66962",
"modified": "2025-10-22T07:04:28Z",
"published": "2025-09-05T18:15:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39689"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "CVE-2025-39689 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.104.2-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2025-39689"
]
}
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