AZL-67505 (CVE-2025-9905)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2025-09-19 09:15 – Updated: 2026-11-18 05:33 – Source websiteThe Keras Model.load_model method can be exploited to achieve arbitrary code execution, even with safe_mode=True.
One can create a specially crafted .h5/.hdf5 model archive that, when loaded via Model.load_model, will trigger arbitrary code to be executed.
This is achieved by crafting a special .h5 archive file that uses the Lambda layer feature of keras which allows arbitrary Python code in the form of pickled code. The vulnerability comes from the fact that the safe_mode=True option is not honored when reading .h5 archives.
Note that the .h5/.hdf5 format is a legacy format supported by Keras 3 for backwards compatibility.
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-9905 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
keras
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/keras
|
Affected: < 3.3.3-4 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "keras",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/keras"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.3.3-4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "The Keras Model.load_model\u00a0method can be exploited to achieve arbitrary code execution, even with safe_mode=True.\n\nOne can create a specially crafted .h5/.hdf5\u00a0model archive that, when loaded via Model.load_model, will trigger arbitrary code to be executed.\n\nThis is achieved by crafting a special .h5\u00a0archive file that uses the Lambda\u00a0layer feature of keras which allows arbitrary Python code in the form of pickled code. The vulnerability comes from the fact that the safe_mode=True\u00a0option is not honored when reading .h5\u00a0archives.\n\nNote that the .h5/.hdf5\u00a0format is a legacy format supported by Keras 3 for backwards compatibility.",
"id": "AZL-67505",
"modified": "2026-11-18T05:33:41Z",
"published": "2025-09-19T09:15:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-9905"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "CVE-2025-9905 affecting package keras for versions less than 3.3.3-4",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2025-9905"
]
}
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