AZL-67563 (CVE-2025-39863)

Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2025-09-19 16:15 – Updated: 2025-11-07 06:53 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
CVE-2025-39863 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.112.1-1
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

wifi: brcmfmac: fix use-after-free when rescheduling brcmf_btcoex_info work

The brcmf_btcoex_detach() only shuts down the btcoex timer, if the flag timer_on is false. However, the brcmf_btcoex_timerfunc(), which runs as timer handler, sets timer_on to false. This creates critical race conditions:

1.If brcmf_btcoex_detach() is called while brcmf_btcoex_timerfunc() is executing, it may observe timer_on as false and skip the call to timer_shutdown_sync().

2.The brcmf_btcoex_timerfunc() may then reschedule the brcmf_btcoex_info worker after the cancel_work_sync() has been executed, resulting in use-after-free bugs.

The use-after-free bugs occur in two distinct scenarios, depending on the timing of when the brcmf_btcoex_info struct is freed relative to the execution of its worker thread.

Scenario 1: Freed before the worker is scheduled

The brcmf_btcoex_info is deallocated before the worker is scheduled. A race condition can occur when schedule_work(&bt_local->work) is called after the target memory has been freed. The sequence of events is detailed below:

CPU0 | CPU1 brcmf_btcoex_detach | brcmf_btcoex_timerfunc | bt_local->timer_on = false; if (cfg->btcoex->timer_on) | ... | cancel_work_sync(); | ... | kfree(cfg->btcoex); // FREE | | schedule_work(&bt_local->work); // USE

Scenario 2: Freed after the worker is scheduled

The brcmf_btcoex_info is freed after the worker has been scheduled but before or during its execution. In this case, statements within the brcmf_btcoex_handler() — such as the container_of macro and subsequent dereferences of the brcmf_btcoex_info object will cause a use-after-free access. The following timeline illustrates this scenario:

CPU0 | CPU1 brcmf_btcoex_detach | brcmf_btcoex_timerfunc | bt_local->timer_on = false; if (cfg->btcoex->timer_on) | ... | cancel_work_sync(); | ... | schedule_work(); // Reschedule | kfree(cfg->btcoex); // FREE | brcmf_btcoex_handler() // Worker /* | btci = container_of(....); // USE The kfree() above could | ... also occur at any point | btci-> // USE during the worker's execution| */ |

To resolve the race conditions, drop the conditional check and call timer_shutdown_sync() directly. It can deactivate the timer reliably, regardless of its current state. Once stopped, the timer_on state is then set to false.

Upstream
References
Impacted products
Ecosystem Package Version
Azure Linux:3 kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
Affected: < 6.6.112.1-1 (ecosystem)

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
        "name": "kernel",
        "purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.6.112.1-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: brcmfmac: fix use-after-free when rescheduling brcmf_btcoex_info work\n\nThe brcmf_btcoex_detach() only shuts down the btcoex timer, if the\nflag timer_on is false. However, the brcmf_btcoex_timerfunc(), which\nruns as timer handler, sets timer_on to false. This creates critical\nrace conditions:\n\n1.If brcmf_btcoex_detach() is called while brcmf_btcoex_timerfunc()\nis executing, it may observe timer_on as false and skip the call to\ntimer_shutdown_sync().\n\n2.The brcmf_btcoex_timerfunc() may then reschedule the brcmf_btcoex_info\nworker after the cancel_work_sync() has been executed, resulting in\nuse-after-free bugs.\n\nThe use-after-free bugs occur in two distinct scenarios, depending on\nthe timing of when the brcmf_btcoex_info struct is freed relative to\nthe execution of its worker thread.\n\nScenario 1: Freed before the worker is scheduled\n\nThe brcmf_btcoex_info is deallocated before the worker is scheduled.\nA race condition can occur when schedule_work(\u0026bt_local-\u003ework) is\ncalled after the target memory has been freed. The sequence of events\nis detailed below:\n\nCPU0                           | CPU1\nbrcmf_btcoex_detach            | brcmf_btcoex_timerfunc\n                               |   bt_local-\u003etimer_on = false;\n  if (cfg-\u003ebtcoex-\u003etimer_on)   |\n    ...                        |\n  cancel_work_sync();          |\n  ...                          |\n  kfree(cfg-\u003ebtcoex); // FREE  |\n                               |   schedule_work(\u0026bt_local-\u003ework); // USE\n\nScenario 2: Freed after the worker is scheduled\n\nThe brcmf_btcoex_info is freed after the worker has been scheduled\nbut before or during its execution. In this case, statements within\nthe brcmf_btcoex_handler() \u2014 such as the container_of macro and\nsubsequent dereferences of the brcmf_btcoex_info object will cause\na use-after-free access. The following timeline illustrates this\nscenario:\n\nCPU0                            | CPU1\nbrcmf_btcoex_detach             | brcmf_btcoex_timerfunc\n                                |   bt_local-\u003etimer_on = false;\n  if (cfg-\u003ebtcoex-\u003etimer_on)    |\n    ...                         |\n  cancel_work_sync();           |\n  ...                           |   schedule_work(); // Reschedule\n                                |\n  kfree(cfg-\u003ebtcoex); // FREE   |   brcmf_btcoex_handler() // Worker\n  /*                            |     btci = container_of(....); // USE\n   The kfree() above could      |     ...\n   also occur at any point      |     btci-\u003e // USE\n   during the worker\u0027s execution|\n   */                           |\n\nTo resolve the race conditions, drop the conditional check and call\ntimer_shutdown_sync() directly. It can deactivate the timer reliably,\nregardless of its current state. Once stopped, the timer_on state is\nthen set to false.",
  "id": "AZL-67563",
  "modified": "2025-11-07T06:53:56Z",
  "published": "2025-09-19T16:15:45Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39863"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.4",
  "summary": "CVE-2025-39863 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.112.1-1",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2025-39863"
  ]
}



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