AZL-68163 (CVE-2025-39945)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2025-10-04 08:15 – Updated: 2025-11-07 06:53 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cnic: Fix use-after-free bugs in cnic_delete_task
The original code uses cancel_delayed_work() in cnic_cm_stop_bnx2x_hw(), which does not guarantee that the delayed work item 'delete_task' has fully completed if it was already running. Additionally, the delayed work item is cyclic, the flush_workqueue() in cnic_cm_stop_bnx2x_hw() only blocks and waits for work items that were already queued to the workqueue prior to its invocation. Any work items submitted after flush_workqueue() is called are not included in the set of tasks that the flush operation awaits. This means that after the cyclic work items have finished executing, a delayed work item may still exist in the workqueue. This leads to use-after-free scenarios where the cnic_dev is deallocated by cnic_free_dev(), while delete_task remains active and attempt to dereference cnic_dev in cnic_delete_task().
A typical race condition is illustrated below:
CPU 0 (cleanup) | CPU 1 (delayed work callback) cnic_netdev_event() | cnic_stop_hw() | cnic_delete_task() cnic_cm_stop_bnx2x_hw() | ... cancel_delayed_work() | /* the queue_delayed_work() flush_workqueue() | executes after flush_workqueue()*/ | queue_delayed_work() cnic_free_dev(dev)//free | cnic_delete_task() //new instance | dev = cp->dev; //use
Replace cancel_delayed_work() with cancel_delayed_work_sync() to ensure that the cyclic delayed work item is properly canceled and that any ongoing execution of the work item completes before the cnic_dev is deallocated. Furthermore, since cancel_delayed_work_sync() uses __flush_work(work, true) to synchronously wait for any currently executing instance of the work item to finish, the flush_workqueue() becomes redundant and should be removed.
This bug was identified through static analysis. To reproduce the issue and validate the fix, I simulated the cnic PCI device in QEMU and introduced intentional delays — such as inserting calls to ssleep() within the cnic_delete_task() function — to increase the likelihood of triggering the bug.
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39945 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: < 6.6.112.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.112.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncnic: Fix use-after-free bugs in cnic_delete_task\n\nThe original code uses cancel_delayed_work() in cnic_cm_stop_bnx2x_hw(),\nwhich does not guarantee that the delayed work item \u0027delete_task\u0027 has\nfully completed if it was already running. Additionally, the delayed work\nitem is cyclic, the flush_workqueue() in cnic_cm_stop_bnx2x_hw() only\nblocks and waits for work items that were already queued to the\nworkqueue prior to its invocation. Any work items submitted after\nflush_workqueue() is called are not included in the set of tasks that the\nflush operation awaits. This means that after the cyclic work items have\nfinished executing, a delayed work item may still exist in the workqueue.\nThis leads to use-after-free scenarios where the cnic_dev is deallocated\nby cnic_free_dev(), while delete_task remains active and attempt to\ndereference cnic_dev in cnic_delete_task().\n\nA typical race condition is illustrated below:\n\nCPU 0 (cleanup) | CPU 1 (delayed work callback)\ncnic_netdev_event() |\n cnic_stop_hw() | cnic_delete_task()\n cnic_cm_stop_bnx2x_hw() | ...\n cancel_delayed_work() | /* the queue_delayed_work()\n flush_workqueue() | executes after flush_workqueue()*/\n | queue_delayed_work()\n cnic_free_dev(dev)//free | cnic_delete_task() //new instance\n | dev = cp-\u003edev; //use\n\nReplace cancel_delayed_work() with cancel_delayed_work_sync() to ensure\nthat the cyclic delayed work item is properly canceled and that any\nongoing execution of the work item completes before the cnic_dev is\ndeallocated. Furthermore, since cancel_delayed_work_sync() uses\n__flush_work(work, true) to synchronously wait for any currently\nexecuting instance of the work item to finish, the flush_workqueue()\nbecomes redundant and should be removed.\n\nThis bug was identified through static analysis. To reproduce the issue\nand validate the fix, I simulated the cnic PCI device in QEMU and\nintroduced intentional delays \u2014 such as inserting calls to ssleep()\nwithin the cnic_delete_task() function \u2014 to increase the likelihood\nof triggering the bug.",
"id": "AZL-68163",
"modified": "2025-11-07T06:53:56Z",
"published": "2025-10-04T08:15:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-39945"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "CVE-2025-39945 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.112.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2025-39945"
]
}
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