AZL-68552 (CVE-2025-21629)

Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2025-01-15 13:15 – Updated: 2026-03-10 17:42 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
CVE-2025-21629 affecting package kernel 5.15.200.1-1
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: reenable NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM offload for BIG TCP packets

The blamed commit disabled hardware offoad of IPv6 packets with extension headers on devices that advertise NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM, based on the definition of that feature in skbuff.h:

      • %NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM
    • Driver (device) is only able to checksum plain
  • TCP or UDP packets over IPv6. These are specifically
  • unencapsulated packets of the form IPv6|TCP or
  • IPv6|UDP where the Next Header field in the IPv6
  • header is either TCP or UDP. IPv6 extension headers
  • are not supported with this feature. This feature
  • cannot be set in features for a device with
  • NETIF_F_HW_CSUM also set. This feature is being
  • DEPRECATED (see below).

The change causes skb_warn_bad_offload to fire for BIG TCP packets.

[ 496.310233] WARNING: CPU: 13 PID: 23472 at net/core/dev.c:3129 skb_warn_bad_offload+0xc4/0xe0

[ 496.310297] ? skb_warn_bad_offload+0xc4/0xe0 [ 496.310300] skb_checksum_help+0x129/0x1f0 [ 496.310303] skb_csum_hwoffload_help+0x150/0x1b0 [ 496.310306] validate_xmit_skb+0x159/0x270 [ 496.310309] validate_xmit_skb_list+0x41/0x70 [ 496.310312] sch_direct_xmit+0x5c/0x250 [ 496.310317] __qdisc_run+0x388/0x620

BIG TCP introduced an IPV6_TLV_JUMBO IPv6 extension header to communicate packet length, as this is an IPv6 jumbogram. But, the feature is only enabled on devices that support BIG TCP TSO. The header is only present for PF_PACKET taps like tcpdump, and not transmitted by physical devices.

For this specific case of extension headers that are not transmitted, return to the situation before the blamed commit and support hardware offload.

ipv6_has_hopopt_jumbo() tests not only whether this header is present, but also that it is the only extension header before a terminal (L4) header.

Upstream
References
Impacted products
Ecosystem Package Version
Azure Linux:2 kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
Affected: ≤ 5.15.200.1-1 (ecosystem)

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Azure Linux:2",
        "name": "kernel",
        "purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "5.15.200.1-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: reenable NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM offload for BIG TCP packets\n\nThe blamed commit disabled hardware offoad of IPv6 packets with\nextension headers on devices that advertise NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM,\nbased on the definition of that feature in skbuff.h:\n\n *   * - %NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM\n *     - Driver (device) is only able to checksum plain\n *       TCP or UDP packets over IPv6. These are specifically\n *       unencapsulated packets of the form IPv6|TCP or\n *       IPv6|UDP where the Next Header field in the IPv6\n *       header is either TCP or UDP. IPv6 extension headers\n *       are not supported with this feature. This feature\n *       cannot be set in features for a device with\n *       NETIF_F_HW_CSUM also set. This feature is being\n *       DEPRECATED (see below).\n\nThe change causes skb_warn_bad_offload to fire for BIG TCP\npackets.\n\n[  496.310233] WARNING: CPU: 13 PID: 23472 at net/core/dev.c:3129 skb_warn_bad_offload+0xc4/0xe0\n\n[  496.310297]  ? skb_warn_bad_offload+0xc4/0xe0\n[  496.310300]  skb_checksum_help+0x129/0x1f0\n[  496.310303]  skb_csum_hwoffload_help+0x150/0x1b0\n[  496.310306]  validate_xmit_skb+0x159/0x270\n[  496.310309]  validate_xmit_skb_list+0x41/0x70\n[  496.310312]  sch_direct_xmit+0x5c/0x250\n[  496.310317]  __qdisc_run+0x388/0x620\n\nBIG TCP introduced an IPV6_TLV_JUMBO IPv6 extension header to\ncommunicate packet length, as this is an IPv6 jumbogram. But, the\nfeature is only enabled on devices that support BIG TCP TSO. The\nheader is only present for PF_PACKET taps like tcpdump, and not\ntransmitted by physical devices.\n\nFor this specific case of extension headers that are not\ntransmitted, return to the situation before the blamed commit\nand support hardware offload.\n\nipv6_has_hopopt_jumbo() tests not only whether this header is present,\nbut also that it is the only extension header before a terminal (L4)\nheader.",
  "id": "AZL-68552",
  "modified": "2026-03-10T17:42:31Z",
  "published": "2025-01-15T13:15:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-21629"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.4",
  "summary": "CVE-2025-21629 affecting package kernel 5.15.200.1-1",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2025-21629"
  ]
}



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