AZL-68585 (CVE-2025-40001)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2025-10-18 08:15 – Updated: 2025-12-06 18:32 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: mvsas: Fix use-after-free bugs in mvs_work_queue
During the detaching of Marvell's SAS/SATA controller, the original code calls cancel_delayed_work() in mvs_free() to cancel the delayed work item mwq->work_q. However, if mwq->work_q is already running, the cancel_delayed_work() may fail to cancel it. This can lead to use-after-free scenarios where mvs_free() frees the mvs_info while mvs_work_queue() is still executing and attempts to access the already-freed mvs_info.
A typical race condition is illustrated below:
CPU 0 (remove) | CPU 1 (delayed work callback) mvs_pci_remove() | mvs_free() | mvs_work_queue() cancel_delayed_work() | kfree(mvi) | | mvi-> // UAF
Replace cancel_delayed_work() with cancel_delayed_work_sync() to ensure that the delayed work item is properly canceled and any executing delayed work item completes before the mvs_info is deallocated.
This bug was found by static analysis.
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40001 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: < 6.6.117.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.117.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nscsi: mvsas: Fix use-after-free bugs in mvs_work_queue\n\nDuring the detaching of Marvell\u0027s SAS/SATA controller, the original code\ncalls cancel_delayed_work() in mvs_free() to cancel the delayed work\nitem mwq-\u003ework_q. However, if mwq-\u003ework_q is already running, the\ncancel_delayed_work() may fail to cancel it. This can lead to\nuse-after-free scenarios where mvs_free() frees the mvs_info while\nmvs_work_queue() is still executing and attempts to access the\nalready-freed mvs_info.\n\nA typical race condition is illustrated below:\n\nCPU 0 (remove) | CPU 1 (delayed work callback)\nmvs_pci_remove() |\n mvs_free() | mvs_work_queue()\n cancel_delayed_work() |\n kfree(mvi) |\n | mvi-\u003e // UAF\n\nReplace cancel_delayed_work() with cancel_delayed_work_sync() to ensure\nthat the delayed work item is properly canceled and any executing\ndelayed work item completes before the mvs_info is deallocated.\n\nThis bug was found by static analysis.",
"id": "AZL-68585",
"modified": "2025-12-06T18:32:38Z",
"published": "2025-10-18T08:15:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40001"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "CVE-2025-40001 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.117.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2025-40001"
]
}
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