AZL-68633 (CVE-2024-57888)

Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2025-01-15 13:15 – Updated: 2026-03-10 17:42 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
CVE-2024-57888 affecting package kernel 5.15.200.1-1
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

workqueue: Do not warn when cancelling WQ_MEM_RECLAIM work from !WQ_MEM_RECLAIM worker

After commit 746ae46c1113 ("drm/sched: Mark scheduler work queues with WQ_MEM_RECLAIM") amdgpu started seeing the following warning:

[ ] workqueue: WQ_MEM_RECLAIM sdma0:drm_sched_run_job_work [gpu_sched] is flushing !WQ_MEM_RECLAIM events:amdgpu_device_delay_enable_gfx_off [amdgpu] ... [ ] Workqueue: sdma0 drm_sched_run_job_work [gpu_sched] ... [ ] Call Trace: [ ] ... [ ] ? check_flush_dependency+0xf5/0x110 ... [ ] cancel_delayed_work_sync+0x6e/0x80 [ ] amdgpu_gfx_off_ctrl+0xab/0x140 [amdgpu] [ ] amdgpu_ring_alloc+0x40/0x50 [amdgpu] [ ] amdgpu_ib_schedule+0xf4/0x810 [amdgpu] [ ] ? drm_sched_run_job_work+0x22c/0x430 [gpu_sched] [ ] amdgpu_job_run+0xaa/0x1f0 [amdgpu] [ ] drm_sched_run_job_work+0x257/0x430 [gpu_sched] [ ] process_one_work+0x217/0x720 ... [ ]

The intent of the verifcation done in check_flush_depedency is to ensure forward progress during memory reclaim, by flagging cases when either a memory reclaim process, or a memory reclaim work item is flushed from a context not marked as memory reclaim safe.

This is correct when flushing, but when called from the cancel(_delayed)_work_sync() paths it is a false positive because work is either already running, or will not be running at all. Therefore cancelling it is safe and we can relax the warning criteria by letting the helper know of the calling context.

References: 746ae46c1113 ("drm/sched: Mark scheduler work queues with WQ_MEM_RECLAIM")

Upstream
References
Impacted products
Ecosystem Package Version
Azure Linux:2 kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
Affected: ≤ 5.15.200.1-1 (ecosystem)

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Azure Linux:2",
        "name": "kernel",
        "purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "5.15.200.1-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nworkqueue: Do not warn when cancelling WQ_MEM_RECLAIM work from !WQ_MEM_RECLAIM worker\n\nAfter commit\n746ae46c1113 (\"drm/sched: Mark scheduler work queues with WQ_MEM_RECLAIM\")\namdgpu started seeing the following warning:\n\n [ ] workqueue: WQ_MEM_RECLAIM sdma0:drm_sched_run_job_work [gpu_sched] is flushing !WQ_MEM_RECLAIM events:amdgpu_device_delay_enable_gfx_off [amdgpu]\n...\n [ ] Workqueue: sdma0 drm_sched_run_job_work [gpu_sched]\n...\n [ ] Call Trace:\n [ ]  \u003cTASK\u003e\n...\n [ ]  ? check_flush_dependency+0xf5/0x110\n...\n [ ]  cancel_delayed_work_sync+0x6e/0x80\n [ ]  amdgpu_gfx_off_ctrl+0xab/0x140 [amdgpu]\n [ ]  amdgpu_ring_alloc+0x40/0x50 [amdgpu]\n [ ]  amdgpu_ib_schedule+0xf4/0x810 [amdgpu]\n [ ]  ? drm_sched_run_job_work+0x22c/0x430 [gpu_sched]\n [ ]  amdgpu_job_run+0xaa/0x1f0 [amdgpu]\n [ ]  drm_sched_run_job_work+0x257/0x430 [gpu_sched]\n [ ]  process_one_work+0x217/0x720\n...\n [ ]  \u003c/TASK\u003e\n\nThe intent of the verifcation done in check_flush_depedency is to ensure\nforward progress during memory reclaim, by flagging cases when either a\nmemory reclaim process, or a memory reclaim work item is flushed from a\ncontext not marked as memory reclaim safe.\n\nThis is correct when flushing, but when called from the\ncancel(_delayed)_work_sync() paths it is a false positive because work is\neither already running, or will not be running at all. Therefore\ncancelling it is safe and we can relax the warning criteria by letting the\nhelper know of the calling context.\n\nReferences: 746ae46c1113 (\"drm/sched: Mark scheduler work queues with WQ_MEM_RECLAIM\")",
  "id": "AZL-68633",
  "modified": "2026-03-10T17:42:31Z",
  "published": "2025-01-15T13:15:13Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-57888"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.4",
  "summary": "CVE-2024-57888 affecting package kernel 5.15.200.1-1",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2024-57888"
  ]
}



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