AZL-69009 (CVE-2025-21831)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2025-03-06 17:15 – Updated: 2026-03-10 17:42 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI: Avoid putting some root ports into D3 on TUXEDO Sirius Gen1
commit 9d26d3a8f1b0 ("PCI: Put PCIe ports into D3 during suspend") sets the policy that all PCIe ports are allowed to use D3. When the system is suspended if the port is not power manageable by the platform and won't be used for wakeup via a PME this sets up the policy for these ports to go into D3hot.
This policy generally makes sense from an OSPM perspective but it leads to problems with wakeup from suspend on the TUXEDO Sirius 16 Gen 1 with a specific old BIOS. This manifests as a system hang.
On the affected Device + BIOS combination, add a quirk for the root port of the problematic controller to ensure that these root ports are not put into D3hot at suspend.
This patch is based on
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-pci/20230708214457.1229-2-mario.limonciello@amd.com
but with the added condition both in the documentation and in the code to apply only to the TUXEDO Sirius 16 Gen 1 with a specific old BIOS and only the affected root ports.
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-21831 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:2 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: ≤ 5.15.200.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:2",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "5.15.200.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nPCI: Avoid putting some root ports into D3 on TUXEDO Sirius Gen1\n\ncommit 9d26d3a8f1b0 (\"PCI: Put PCIe ports into D3 during suspend\") sets the\npolicy that all PCIe ports are allowed to use D3. When the system is\nsuspended if the port is not power manageable by the platform and won\u0027t be\nused for wakeup via a PME this sets up the policy for these ports to go\ninto D3hot.\n\nThis policy generally makes sense from an OSPM perspective but it leads to\nproblems with wakeup from suspend on the TUXEDO Sirius 16 Gen 1 with a\nspecific old BIOS. This manifests as a system hang.\n\nOn the affected Device + BIOS combination, add a quirk for the root port of\nthe problematic controller to ensure that these root ports are not put into\nD3hot at suspend.\n\nThis patch is based on\n\n https://lore.kernel.org/linux-pci/20230708214457.1229-2-mario.limonciello@amd.com\n\nbut with the added condition both in the documentation and in the code to\napply only to the TUXEDO Sirius 16 Gen 1 with a specific old BIOS and only\nthe affected root ports.",
"id": "AZL-69009",
"modified": "2026-03-10T17:42:31Z",
"published": "2025-03-06T17:15:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-21831"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "CVE-2025-21831 affecting package kernel 5.15.200.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2025-21831"
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.