AZL-69737 (CVE-2025-37750)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2025-05-01 13:15 – Updated: 2026-11-18 05:33 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix UAF in decryption with multichannel
After commit f7025d861694 ("smb: client: allocate crypto only for primary server") and commit b0abcd65ec54 ("smb: client: fix UAF in async decryption"), the channels started reusing AEAD TFM from primary channel to perform synchronous decryption, but that can't done as there could be multiple cifsd threads (one per channel) simultaneously accessing it to perform decryption.
This fixes the following KASAN splat when running fstest generic/249 with 'vers=3.1.1,multichannel,max_channels=4,seal' against Windows Server 2022:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in gf128mul_4k_lle+0xba/0x110 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881046c18a0 by task cifsd/986 CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 986 Comm: cifsd Not tainted 6.15.0-rc1 #1 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-3.fc41 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80 print_report+0x156/0x528 ? gf128mul_4k_lle+0xba/0x110 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x145/0x300 ? __phys_addr+0x46/0x90 ? gf128mul_4k_lle+0xba/0x110 kasan_report+0xdf/0x1a0 ? gf128mul_4k_lle+0xba/0x110 gf128mul_4k_lle+0xba/0x110 ghash_update+0x189/0x210 shash_ahash_update+0x295/0x370 ? __pfx_shash_ahash_update+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_shash_ahash_update+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_extract_iter_to_sg+0x10/0x10 ? ___kmalloc_large_node+0x10e/0x180 ? __asan_memset+0x23/0x50 crypto_ahash_update+0x3c/0xc0 gcm_hash_assoc_remain_continue+0x93/0xc0 crypt_message+0xe09/0xec0 [cifs] ? __pfx_crypt_message+0x10/0x10 [cifs] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x23/0x40 ? __pfx_cifs_readv_from_socket+0x10/0x10 [cifs] decrypt_raw_data+0x229/0x380 [cifs] ? __pfx_decrypt_raw_data+0x10/0x10 [cifs] ? __pfx_cifs_read_iter_from_socket+0x10/0x10 [cifs] smb3_receive_transform+0x837/0xc80 [cifs] ? __pfx_smb3_receive_transform+0x10/0x10 [cifs] ? __pfx___might_resched+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_smb3_is_transform_hdr+0x10/0x10 [cifs] cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x692/0x1570 [cifs] ? __pfx_cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x10/0x10 [cifs] ? rcu_is_watching+0x20/0x50 ? rcu_lockdep_current_cpu_online+0x62/0xb0 ? find_held_lock+0x32/0x90 ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x11/0x20 ? local_clock_noinstr+0xd/0xd0 ? trace_irq_enable.constprop.0+0xa8/0xe0 ? __pfx_cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x10/0x10 [cifs] kthread+0x1fe/0x380 ? kthread+0x10f/0x380 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ? local_clock_noinstr+0xd/0xd0 ? ret_from_fork+0x1b/0x60 ? local_clock+0x15/0x30 ? lock_release+0x29b/0x390 ? rcu_is_watching+0x20/0x50 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x60 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37750 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: ≤ 6.6.161.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "6.6.161.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsmb: client: fix UAF in decryption with multichannel\n\nAfter commit f7025d861694 (\"smb: client: allocate crypto only for\nprimary server\") and commit b0abcd65ec54 (\"smb: client: fix UAF in\nasync decryption\"), the channels started reusing AEAD TFM from primary\nchannel to perform synchronous decryption, but that can\u0027t done as\nthere could be multiple cifsd threads (one per channel) simultaneously\naccessing it to perform decryption.\n\nThis fixes the following KASAN splat when running fstest generic/249\nwith \u0027vers=3.1.1,multichannel,max_channels=4,seal\u0027 against Windows\nServer 2022:\n\nBUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in gf128mul_4k_lle+0xba/0x110\nRead of size 8 at addr ffff8881046c18a0 by task cifsd/986\nCPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 986 Comm: cifsd Not tainted 6.15.0-rc1 #1\nPREEMPT(voluntary)\nHardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-3.fc41\n04/01/2014\nCall Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80\n print_report+0x156/0x528\n ? gf128mul_4k_lle+0xba/0x110\n ? __virt_addr_valid+0x145/0x300\n ? __phys_addr+0x46/0x90\n ? gf128mul_4k_lle+0xba/0x110\n kasan_report+0xdf/0x1a0\n ? gf128mul_4k_lle+0xba/0x110\n gf128mul_4k_lle+0xba/0x110\n ghash_update+0x189/0x210\n shash_ahash_update+0x295/0x370\n ? __pfx_shash_ahash_update+0x10/0x10\n ? __pfx_shash_ahash_update+0x10/0x10\n ? __pfx_extract_iter_to_sg+0x10/0x10\n ? ___kmalloc_large_node+0x10e/0x180\n ? __asan_memset+0x23/0x50\n crypto_ahash_update+0x3c/0xc0\n gcm_hash_assoc_remain_continue+0x93/0xc0\n crypt_message+0xe09/0xec0 [cifs]\n ? __pfx_crypt_message+0x10/0x10 [cifs]\n ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x23/0x40\n ? __pfx_cifs_readv_from_socket+0x10/0x10 [cifs]\n decrypt_raw_data+0x229/0x380 [cifs]\n ? __pfx_decrypt_raw_data+0x10/0x10 [cifs]\n ? __pfx_cifs_read_iter_from_socket+0x10/0x10 [cifs]\n smb3_receive_transform+0x837/0xc80 [cifs]\n ? __pfx_smb3_receive_transform+0x10/0x10 [cifs]\n ? __pfx___might_resched+0x10/0x10\n ? __pfx_smb3_is_transform_hdr+0x10/0x10 [cifs]\n cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x692/0x1570 [cifs]\n ? __pfx_cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x10/0x10 [cifs]\n ? rcu_is_watching+0x20/0x50\n ? rcu_lockdep_current_cpu_online+0x62/0xb0\n ? find_held_lock+0x32/0x90\n ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x11/0x20\n ? local_clock_noinstr+0xd/0xd0\n ? trace_irq_enable.constprop.0+0xa8/0xe0\n ? __pfx_cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x10/0x10 [cifs]\n kthread+0x1fe/0x380\n ? kthread+0x10f/0x380\n ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10\n ? local_clock_noinstr+0xd/0xd0\n ? ret_from_fork+0x1b/0x60\n ? local_clock+0x15/0x30\n ? lock_release+0x29b/0x390\n ? rcu_is_watching+0x20/0x50\n ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10\n ret_from_fork+0x31/0x60\n ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10\n ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30\n \u003c/TASK\u003e",
"id": "AZL-69737",
"modified": "2026-11-18T05:33:41Z",
"published": "2025-05-01T13:15:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-37750"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "CVE-2025-37750 affecting package kernel 6.6.161.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2025-37750"
]
}
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