AZL-71924 (CVE-2023-53438)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2025-09-18 16:15 – Updated: 2026-03-10 17:42 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/MCE: Always save CS register on AMD Zen IF Poison errors
The Instruction Fetch (IF) units on current AMD Zen-based systems do not guarantee a synchronous #MC is delivered for poison consumption errors. Therefore, MCG_STATUS[EIPV|RIPV] will not be set. However, the microarchitecture does guarantee that the exception is delivered within the same context. In other words, the exact rIP is not known, but the context is known to not have changed.
There is no architecturally-defined method to determine this behavior.
The Code Segment (CS) register is always valid on such IF unit poison errors regardless of the value of MCG_STATUS[EIPV|RIPV].
Add a quirk to save the CS register for poison consumption from the IF unit banks.
This is needed to properly determine the context of the error. Otherwise, the severity grading function will assume the context is IN_KERNEL due to the m->cs value being 0 (the initialized value). This leads to unnecessary kernel panics on data poison errors due to the kernel believing the poison consumption occurred in kernel context.
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-53438 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:2 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: ≤ 5.15.200.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:2",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "5.15.200.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nx86/MCE: Always save CS register on AMD Zen IF Poison errors\n\nThe Instruction Fetch (IF) units on current AMD Zen-based systems do not\nguarantee a synchronous #MC is delivered for poison consumption errors.\nTherefore, MCG_STATUS[EIPV|RIPV] will not be set. However, the\nmicroarchitecture does guarantee that the exception is delivered within\nthe same context. In other words, the exact rIP is not known, but the\ncontext is known to not have changed.\n\nThere is no architecturally-defined method to determine this behavior.\n\nThe Code Segment (CS) register is always valid on such IF unit poison\nerrors regardless of the value of MCG_STATUS[EIPV|RIPV].\n\nAdd a quirk to save the CS register for poison consumption from the IF\nunit banks.\n\nThis is needed to properly determine the context of the error.\nOtherwise, the severity grading function will assume the context is\nIN_KERNEL due to the m-\u003ecs value being 0 (the initialized value). This\nleads to unnecessary kernel panics on data poison errors due to the\nkernel believing the poison consumption occurred in kernel context.",
"id": "AZL-71924",
"modified": "2026-03-10T17:42:31Z",
"published": "2025-09-18T16:15:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-53438"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "CVE-2023-53438 affecting package kernel 5.15.200.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2023-53438"
]
}
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