AZL-76410 (CVE-2023-53635)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2025-10-07 16:15 – Updated: 2026-03-10 17:42 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: conntrack: fix wrong ct->timeout value
(struct nf_conn)->timeout is an interval before the conntrack confirmed. After confirmed, it becomes a timestamp.
It is observed that timeout of an unconfirmed conntrack:
- Set by calling ctnetlink_change_timeout(). As a result,
nfct_time_stamp was wrongly added to ct->timeout twice.
- Get by calling ctnetlink_dump_timeout(). As a result,
nfct_time_stamp was wrongly subtracted.
Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl ctnetlink_dump_timeout __ctnetlink_glue_build ctnetlink_glue_build __nfqnl_enqueue_packet nf_queue nf_hook_slow ip_mc_output ? __pfx_ip_finish_output ip_send_skb ? __pfx_dst_output udp_send_skb udp_sendmsg ? __pfx_ip_generic_getfrag sock_sendmsg
Separate the 2 cases in:
- Setting ct->timeout in __nf_ct_set_timeout().
- Getting ct->timeout in ctnetlink_dump_timeout().
Pablo appends:
Update ctnetlink to set up the timeout after the IPS_CONFIRMED flag is set on, otherwise conntrack creation via ctnetlink breaks.
Note that the problem described in this patch occurs since the introduction of the nfnetlink_queue conntrack support, select a sufficiently old Fixes: tag for -stable kernel to pick up this fix.
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-53635 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:2 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: ≤ 5.15.200.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:2",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "5.15.200.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnetfilter: conntrack: fix wrong ct-\u003etimeout value\n\n(struct nf_conn)-\u003etimeout is an interval before the conntrack\nconfirmed. After confirmed, it becomes a timestamp.\n\nIt is observed that timeout of an unconfirmed conntrack:\n- Set by calling ctnetlink_change_timeout(). As a result,\n `nfct_time_stamp` was wrongly added to `ct-\u003etimeout` twice.\n- Get by calling ctnetlink_dump_timeout(). As a result,\n `nfct_time_stamp` was wrongly subtracted.\n\nCall Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n dump_stack_lvl\n ctnetlink_dump_timeout\n __ctnetlink_glue_build\n ctnetlink_glue_build\n __nfqnl_enqueue_packet\n nf_queue\n nf_hook_slow\n ip_mc_output\n ? __pfx_ip_finish_output\n ip_send_skb\n ? __pfx_dst_output\n udp_send_skb\n udp_sendmsg\n ? __pfx_ip_generic_getfrag\n sock_sendmsg\n\nSeparate the 2 cases in:\n- Setting `ct-\u003etimeout` in __nf_ct_set_timeout().\n- Getting `ct-\u003etimeout` in ctnetlink_dump_timeout().\n\nPablo appends:\n\nUpdate ctnetlink to set up the timeout _after_ the IPS_CONFIRMED flag is\nset on, otherwise conntrack creation via ctnetlink breaks.\n\nNote that the problem described in this patch occurs since the\nintroduction of the nfnetlink_queue conntrack support, select a\nsufficiently old Fixes: tag for -stable kernel to pick up this fix.",
"id": "AZL-76410",
"modified": "2026-03-10T17:42:31Z",
"published": "2025-10-07T16:15:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-53635"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "CVE-2023-53635 affecting package kernel 5.15.200.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2023-53635"
]
}
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