AZL-77594 (CVE-2026-2391)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-02-12 05:17 – Updated: 2026-11-18 05:27 – Source websiteSummary
The arrayLimit option in qs does not enforce limits for comma-separated values when comma: true is enabled, allowing attackers to cause denial-of-service via memory exhaustion. This is a bypass of the array limit enforcement, similar to the bracket notation bypass addressed in GHSA-6rw7-vpxm-498p (CVE-2025-15284).
Details
When the comma option is set to true (not the default, but configurable in applications), qs allows parsing comma-separated strings as arrays (e.g., ?param=a,b,c becomes ['a', 'b', 'c']). However, the limit check for arrayLimit (default: 20) and the optional throwOnLimitExceeded occur after the comma-handling logic in parseArrayValue, enabling a bypass. This permits creation of arbitrarily large arrays from a single parameter, leading to excessive memory allocation.
Vulnerable code (lib/parse.js: lines ~40-50):
if (val && typeof val === 'string' && options.comma && val.indexOf(',') > -1) {
return val.split(',');
}
if (options.throwOnLimitExceeded && currentArrayLength >= options.arrayLimit) {
throw new RangeError('Array limit exceeded. Only ' + options.arrayLimit + ' element' + (options.arrayLimit === 1 ? '' : 's') + ' allowed in an array.');
}
return val;
The split(',') returns the array immediately, skipping the subsequent limit check. Downstream merging via utils.combine does not prevent allocation, even if it marks overflows for sparse arrays.This discrepancy allows attackers to send a single parameter with millions of commas (e.g., ?param=,,,,,,,,...), allocating massive arrays in memory without triggering limits. It bypasses the intent of arrayLimit, which is enforced correctly for indexed (a[0]=) and bracket (a[]=) notations (the latter fixed in v6.14.1 per GHSA-6rw7-vpxm-498p).
PoC
Test 1 - Basic bypass:
npm install qs
const qs = require('qs');
const payload = 'a=' + ','.repeat(25); // 26 elements after split (bypasses arrayLimit: 5)
const options = { comma: true, arrayLimit: 5, throwOnLimitExceeded: true };
try {
const result = qs.parse(payload, options);
console.log(result.a.length); // Outputs: 26 (bypass successful)
} catch (e) {
console.log('Limit enforced:', e.message); // Not thrown
}
Configuration:
- comma: true
- arrayLimit: 5
- throwOnLimitExceeded: true
Expected: Throws "Array limit exceeded" error. Actual: Parses successfully, creating an array of length 26.
Impact
Denial of Service (DoS) via memory exhaustion.
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-2391 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
js-jquery
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/js-jquery
|
Affected: ≤ 3.5.0-4 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "js-jquery",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/js-jquery"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "3.5.0-4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "### Summary\nThe `arrayLimit` option in qs does not enforce limits for comma-separated values when `comma: true` is enabled, allowing attackers to cause denial-of-service via memory exhaustion. This is a bypass of the array limit enforcement, similar to the bracket notation bypass addressed in GHSA-6rw7-vpxm-498p (CVE-2025-15284).\n\n### Details\nWhen the `comma` option is set to `true` (not the default, but configurable in applications), qs allows parsing comma-separated strings as arrays (e.g., `?param=a,b,c` becomes `[\u0027a\u0027, \u0027b\u0027, \u0027c\u0027]`). However, the limit check for `arrayLimit` (default: 20) and the optional throwOnLimitExceeded occur after the comma-handling logic in `parseArrayValue`, enabling a bypass. This permits creation of arbitrarily large arrays from a single parameter, leading to excessive memory allocation.\n\n**Vulnerable code** (lib/parse.js: lines ~40-50):\n```js\nif (val \u0026\u0026 typeof val === \u0027string\u0027 \u0026\u0026 options.comma \u0026\u0026 val.indexOf(\u0027,\u0027) \u003e -1) {\n\u00a0 \u00a0 return val.split(\u0027,\u0027);\n}\n\nif (options.throwOnLimitExceeded \u0026\u0026 currentArrayLength \u003e= options.arrayLimit) {\n\u00a0 \u00a0 throw new RangeError(\u0027Array limit exceeded. Only \u0027 + options.arrayLimit + \u0027 element\u0027 + (options.arrayLimit === 1 ? \u0027\u0027 : \u0027s\u0027) + \u0027 allowed in an array.\u0027);\n}\n\nreturn val;\n```\nThe `split(\u0027,\u0027)` returns the array immediately, skipping the subsequent limit check. Downstream merging via `utils.combine` does not prevent allocation, even if it marks overflows for sparse arrays.This discrepancy allows attackers to send a single parameter with millions of commas (e.g., `?param=,,,,,,,,...`), allocating massive arrays in memory without triggering limits. It bypasses the intent of `arrayLimit`, which is enforced correctly for indexed (`a[0]=`) and bracket (`a[]=`) notations (the latter fixed in v6.14.1 per GHSA-6rw7-vpxm-498p).\n\n### PoC\n**Test 1 - Basic bypass:**\n```\nnpm install qs\n```\n\n```js\nconst qs = require(\u0027qs\u0027);\n\nconst payload = \u0027a=\u0027 + \u0027,\u0027.repeat(25); // 26 elements after split (bypasses arrayLimit: 5)\nconst options = { comma: true, arrayLimit: 5, throwOnLimitExceeded: true };\n\ntry {\n\u00a0 const result = qs.parse(payload, options);\n\u00a0 console.log(result.a.length); // Outputs: 26 (bypass successful)\n} catch (e) {\n\u00a0 console.log(\u0027Limit enforced:\u0027, e.message); // Not thrown\n}\n```\n**Configuration:**\n- `comma: true`\n- `arrayLimit: 5`\n- `throwOnLimitExceeded: true`\n\nExpected: Throws \"Array limit exceeded\" error.\nActual: Parses successfully, creating an array of length 26.\n\n\n### Impact\nDenial of Service (DoS) via memory exhaustion.",
"id": "AZL-77594",
"modified": "2026-11-18T05:27:31Z",
"published": "2026-02-12T05:17:11Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-2391"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "CVE-2026-2391 affecting package js-jquery 3.5.0-4",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-2391"
]
}
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