AZL-78383 (CVE-2025-40039)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2025-10-28 12:15 – Updated: 2026-03-10 17:42 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: Fix race condition in RPC handle list access
The 'sess->rpc_handle_list' XArray manages RPC handles within a ksmbd session. Access to this list is intended to be protected by 'sess->rpc_lock' (an rw_semaphore). However, the locking implementation was flawed, leading to potential race conditions.
In ksmbd_session_rpc_open(), the code incorrectly acquired only a read lock before calling xa_store() and xa_erase(). Since these operations modify the XArray structure, a write lock is required to ensure exclusive access and prevent data corruption from concurrent modifications.
Furthermore, ksmbd_session_rpc_method() accessed the list using xa_load() without holding any lock at all. This could lead to reading inconsistent data or a potential use-after-free if an entry is concurrently removed and the pointer is dereferenced.
Fix these issues by: 1. Using down_write() and up_write() in ksmbd_session_rpc_open() to ensure exclusive access during XArray modification, and ensuring the lock is correctly released on error paths. 2. Adding down_read() and up_read() in ksmbd_session_rpc_method() to safely protect the lookup.
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40039 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:2 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: ≤ 5.15.200.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:2",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "5.15.200.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nksmbd: Fix race condition in RPC handle list access\n\nThe \u0027sess-\u003erpc_handle_list\u0027 XArray manages RPC handles within a ksmbd\nsession. Access to this list is intended to be protected by\n\u0027sess-\u003erpc_lock\u0027 (an rw_semaphore). However, the locking implementation was\nflawed, leading to potential race conditions.\n\nIn ksmbd_session_rpc_open(), the code incorrectly acquired only a read lock\nbefore calling xa_store() and xa_erase(). Since these operations modify\nthe XArray structure, a write lock is required to ensure exclusive access\nand prevent data corruption from concurrent modifications.\n\nFurthermore, ksmbd_session_rpc_method() accessed the list using xa_load()\nwithout holding any lock at all. This could lead to reading inconsistent\ndata or a potential use-after-free if an entry is concurrently removed and\nthe pointer is dereferenced.\n\nFix these issues by:\n1. Using down_write() and up_write() in ksmbd_session_rpc_open()\n to ensure exclusive access during XArray modification, and ensuring\n the lock is correctly released on error paths.\n2. Adding down_read() and up_read() in ksmbd_session_rpc_method()\n to safely protect the lookup.",
"id": "AZL-78383",
"modified": "2026-03-10T17:42:31Z",
"published": "2025-10-28T12:15:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40039"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "CVE-2025-40039 affecting package kernel 5.15.200.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2025-40039"
]
}
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