AZL-78491 (CVE-2026-22998)

Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-01-25 15:15 – Updated: 2026-03-04 06:18 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
CVE-2026-22998 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.126.1-1
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nvme-tcp: fix NULL pointer dereferences in nvmet_tcp_build_pdu_iovec

Commit efa56305908b ("nvmet-tcp: Fix a kernel panic when host sends an invalid H2C PDU length") added ttag bounds checking and data_offset validation in nvmet_tcp_handle_h2c_data_pdu(), but it did not validate whether the command's data structures (cmd->req.sg and cmd->iov) have been properly initialized before processing H2C_DATA PDUs.

The nvmet_tcp_build_pdu_iovec() function dereferences these pointers without NULL checks. This can be triggered by sending H2C_DATA PDU immediately after the ICREQ/ICRESP handshake, before sending a CONNECT command or NVMe write command.

Attack vectors that trigger NULL pointer dereferences: 1. H2C_DATA PDU sent before CONNECT → both pointers NULL 2. H2C_DATA PDU for READ command → cmd->req.sg allocated, cmd->iov NULL 3. H2C_DATA PDU for uninitialized command slot → both pointers NULL

The fix validates both cmd->req.sg and cmd->iov before calling nvmet_tcp_build_pdu_iovec(). Both checks are required because: - Uninitialized commands: both NULL - READ commands: cmd->req.sg allocated, cmd->iov NULL - WRITE commands: both allocated

Upstream
References
Impacted products
Ecosystem Package Version
Azure Linux:3 kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
Affected: < 6.6.126.1-1 (ecosystem)

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
        "name": "kernel",
        "purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.6.126.1-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnvme-tcp: fix NULL pointer dereferences in nvmet_tcp_build_pdu_iovec\n\nCommit efa56305908b (\"nvmet-tcp: Fix a kernel panic when host sends an invalid H2C PDU length\")\nadded ttag bounds checking and data_offset\nvalidation in nvmet_tcp_handle_h2c_data_pdu(), but it did not validate\nwhether the command\u0027s data structures (cmd-\u003ereq.sg and cmd-\u003eiov) have\nbeen properly initialized before processing H2C_DATA PDUs.\n\nThe nvmet_tcp_build_pdu_iovec() function dereferences these pointers\nwithout NULL checks. This can be triggered by sending H2C_DATA PDU\nimmediately after the ICREQ/ICRESP handshake, before\nsending a CONNECT command or NVMe write command.\n\nAttack vectors that trigger NULL pointer dereferences:\n1. H2C_DATA PDU sent before CONNECT \u2192 both pointers NULL\n2. H2C_DATA PDU for READ command \u2192 cmd-\u003ereq.sg allocated, cmd-\u003eiov NULL\n3. H2C_DATA PDU for uninitialized command slot \u2192 both pointers NULL\n\nThe fix validates both cmd-\u003ereq.sg and cmd-\u003eiov before calling\nnvmet_tcp_build_pdu_iovec(). Both checks are required because:\n- Uninitialized commands: both NULL\n- READ commands: cmd-\u003ereq.sg allocated, cmd-\u003eiov NULL\n- WRITE commands: both allocated",
  "id": "AZL-78491",
  "modified": "2026-03-04T06:18:15Z",
  "published": "2026-01-25T15:15:54Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22998"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.4",
  "summary": "CVE-2026-22998 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.126.1-1",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-22998"
  ]
}



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