AZL-83225 (CVE-2026-31474)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-04-22 14:16 – Updated: 2026-04-29 06:35 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: isotp: fix tx.buf use-after-free in isotp_sendmsg()
isotp_sendmsg() uses only cmpxchg() on so->tx.state to serialize access to so->tx.buf. isotp_release() waits for ISOTP_IDLE via wait_event_interruptible() and then calls kfree(so->tx.buf).
If a signal interrupts the wait_event_interruptible() inside close() while tx.state is ISOTP_SENDING, the loop exits early and release proceeds to force ISOTP_SHUTDOWN and continues to kfree(so->tx.buf) while sendmsg may still be reading so->tx.buf for the final CAN frame in isotp_fill_dataframe().
The so->tx.buf can be allocated once when the standard tx.buf length needs to be extended. Move the kfree() of this potentially extended tx.buf to sk_destruct time when either isotp_sendmsg() and isotp_release() are done.
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31474 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: < 6.6.134.1-2 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.134.1-2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncan: isotp: fix tx.buf use-after-free in isotp_sendmsg()\n\nisotp_sendmsg() uses only cmpxchg() on so-\u003etx.state to serialize access\nto so-\u003etx.buf. isotp_release() waits for ISOTP_IDLE via\nwait_event_interruptible() and then calls kfree(so-\u003etx.buf).\n\nIf a signal interrupts the wait_event_interruptible() inside close()\nwhile tx.state is ISOTP_SENDING, the loop exits early and release\nproceeds to force ISOTP_SHUTDOWN and continues to kfree(so-\u003etx.buf)\nwhile sendmsg may still be reading so-\u003etx.buf for the final CAN frame\nin isotp_fill_dataframe().\n\nThe so-\u003etx.buf can be allocated once when the standard tx.buf length needs\nto be extended. Move the kfree() of this potentially extended tx.buf to\nsk_destruct time when either isotp_sendmsg() and isotp_release() are done.",
"id": "AZL-83225",
"modified": "2026-04-29T06:35:10Z",
"published": "2026-04-22T14:16:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31474"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "CVE-2026-31474 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.134.1-2",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-31474"
]
}
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