AZL-84032 (CVE-2026-31585)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-04-24 15:16 – Updated: 2026-05-06 06:22 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: vidtv: fix nfeeds state corruption on start_streaming failure
syzbot reported a memory leak in vidtv_psi_service_desc_init [1].
When vidtv_start_streaming() fails inside vidtv_start_feed(), the nfeeds counter is left incremented even though no feed was actually started. This corrupts the driver state: subsequent start_feed calls see nfeeds > 1 and skip starting the mux, while stop_feed calls eventually try to stop a non-existent stream.
This state corruption can also lead to memory leaks, since the mux and channel resources may be partially allocated during a failed start_streaming but never cleaned up, as the stop path finds dvb->streaming == false and returns early.
Fix by decrementing nfeeds back when start_streaming fails, keeping the counter in sync with the actual number of active feeds.
[1] BUG: memory leak unreferenced object 0xffff888145b50820 (size 32): comm "syz.0.17", pid 6068, jiffies 4294944486 backtrace (crc 90a0c7d4): vidtv_psi_service_desc_init+0x74/0x1b0 drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_psi.c:288 vidtv_channel_s302m_init+0xb1/0x2a0 drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_channel.c:83 vidtv_channels_init+0x1b/0x40 drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_channel.c:524 vidtv_mux_init+0x516/0xbe0 drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_mux.c:518 vidtv_start_streaming drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_bridge.c:194 [inline] vidtv_start_feed+0x33e/0x4d0 drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_bridge.c:239
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31585 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: < 6.6.137.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.137.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmedia: vidtv: fix nfeeds state corruption on start_streaming failure\n\nsyzbot reported a memory leak in vidtv_psi_service_desc_init [1].\n\nWhen vidtv_start_streaming() fails inside vidtv_start_feed(), the\nnfeeds counter is left incremented even though no feed was actually\nstarted. This corrupts the driver state: subsequent start_feed calls\nsee nfeeds \u003e 1 and skip starting the mux, while stop_feed calls\neventually try to stop a non-existent stream.\n\nThis state corruption can also lead to memory leaks, since the mux\nand channel resources may be partially allocated during a failed\nstart_streaming but never cleaned up, as the stop path finds\ndvb-\u003estreaming == false and returns early.\n\nFix by decrementing nfeeds back when start_streaming fails, keeping\nthe counter in sync with the actual number of active feeds.\n\n[1]\nBUG: memory leak\nunreferenced object 0xffff888145b50820 (size 32):\n comm \"syz.0.17\", pid 6068, jiffies 4294944486\n backtrace (crc 90a0c7d4):\n vidtv_psi_service_desc_init+0x74/0x1b0 drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_psi.c:288\n vidtv_channel_s302m_init+0xb1/0x2a0 drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_channel.c:83\n vidtv_channels_init+0x1b/0x40 drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_channel.c:524\n vidtv_mux_init+0x516/0xbe0 drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_mux.c:518\n vidtv_start_streaming drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_bridge.c:194 [inline]\n vidtv_start_feed+0x33e/0x4d0 drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_bridge.c:239",
"id": "AZL-84032",
"modified": "2026-05-06T06:22:03Z",
"published": "2026-04-24T15:16:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31585"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "CVE-2026-31585 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.137.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-31585"
]
}
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