AZL-88689 (CVE-2026-46004)

Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-05-27 14:17 – Updated: 2026-06-17 06:15 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
CVE-2026-46004 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.141.1-1
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ALSA: caiaq: Handle probe errors properly

The probe procedure of setup_card() in caiaq driver doesn't treat the error cases gracefully, e.g. the error from snd_card_register() calls snd_card_free() but continues. This would lead to a UAF for the further calls like snd_usb_caiaq_control_init(), as Berk suggested in another patch in the link below.

However, the problem is not only that; in general, this function drops the all error handlings (as it's a void function) although its caller can propagate an error to snd_probe(), which eventually calls snd_card_free() as a proper error path. That said, we should treat each error case in setup_card(), and just return the error code promptly, which is then handled later as a fatal error in snd_probe().

This patch achieves it by changing the setup_card() to return an error code. Also, the superfluous snd_card_free() call is removed, too.

Note that card->private_free can be set still safely at returning an error. All called functions in card_free() have checks of the unassigned resources or NULL checks.

Upstream
References
Impacted products
Ecosystem Package Version
Azure Linux:3 kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
Affected: < 6.6.141.1-1 (ecosystem)

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
        "name": "kernel",
        "purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.6.141.1-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nALSA: caiaq: Handle probe errors properly\n\nThe probe procedure of setup_card() in caiaq driver doesn\u0027t treat the\nerror cases gracefully, e.g. the error from snd_card_register() calls\nsnd_card_free() but continues.  This would lead to a UAF for the\nfurther calls like snd_usb_caiaq_control_init(), as Berk suggested in\nanother patch in the link below.\n\nHowever, the problem is not only that; in general, this function drops\nthe all error handlings (as it\u0027s a void function) although its caller\ncan propagate an error to snd_probe(), which eventually calls\nsnd_card_free() as a proper error path.  That said, we should treat\neach error case in setup_card(), and just return the error code\npromptly, which is then handled later as a fatal error in snd_probe().\n\nThis patch achieves it by changing the setup_card() to return an error\ncode.  Also, the superfluous snd_card_free() call is removed, too.\n\nNote that card-\u003eprivate_free can be set still safely at returning an\nerror.  All called functions in card_free() have checks of the\nunassigned resources or NULL checks.",
  "id": "AZL-88689",
  "modified": "2026-06-17T06:15:31Z",
  "published": "2026-05-27T14:17:18Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46004"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.4",
  "summary": "CVE-2026-46004 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.141.1-1",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-46004"
  ]
}



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