AZL-88698 (CVE-2026-46080)

Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-05-27 14:17 – Updated: 2026-06-17 06:15 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
CVE-2026-46080 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.141.1-1
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ocfs2: split transactions in dio completion to avoid credit exhaustion

During ocfs2 dio operations, JBD2 may report warnings via following call trace: ocfs2_dio_end_io_write ocfs2_mark_extent_written ocfs2_change_extent_flag ocfs2_split_extent ocfs2_try_to_merge_extent ocfs2_extend_rotate_transaction ocfs2_extend_trans jbd2__journal_restart start_this_handle output: JBD2: kworker/6:2 wants too many credits credits:5450 rsv_credits:0 max:5449

To prevent exceeding the credits limit, modify ocfs2_dio_end_io_write() to handle extents in a batch of transaction.

Additionally, relocate ocfs2_del_inode_from_orphan(). The orphan inode should only be removed from the orphan list after the extent tree update is complete. This ensures that if a crash occurs in the middle of extent tree updates, we won't leave stale blocks beyond EOF.

This patch also changes the logic for updating the inode size and removing orphan, making it similar to ext4_dio_write_end_io(). Both operations are performed only when everything looks good.

Finally, thanks to Jans and Joseph for providing the bug fix prototype and suggestions.

Upstream
References
Impacted products
Ecosystem Package Version
Azure Linux:3 kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
Affected: < 6.6.141.1-1 (ecosystem)

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
        "name": "kernel",
        "purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.6.141.1-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nocfs2: split transactions in dio completion to avoid credit exhaustion\n\nDuring ocfs2 dio operations, JBD2 may report warnings via following\ncall trace:\nocfs2_dio_end_io_write\n ocfs2_mark_extent_written\n  ocfs2_change_extent_flag\n   ocfs2_split_extent\n    ocfs2_try_to_merge_extent\n     ocfs2_extend_rotate_transaction\n      ocfs2_extend_trans\n       jbd2__journal_restart\n        start_this_handle\n         output: JBD2: kworker/6:2 wants too many credits credits:5450 rsv_credits:0 max:5449\n\nTo prevent exceeding the credits limit, modify ocfs2_dio_end_io_write() to\nhandle extents in a batch of transaction.\n\nAdditionally, relocate ocfs2_del_inode_from_orphan().  The orphan inode\nshould only be removed from the orphan list after the extent tree update\nis complete.  This ensures that if a crash occurs in the middle of extent\ntree updates, we won\u0027t leave stale blocks beyond EOF.\n\nThis patch also changes the logic for updating the inode size and removing\norphan, making it similar to ext4_dio_write_end_io().  Both operations are\nperformed only when everything looks good.\n\nFinally, thanks to Jans and Joseph for providing the bug fix prototype and\nsuggestions.",
  "id": "AZL-88698",
  "modified": "2026-06-17T06:15:31Z",
  "published": "2026-05-27T14:17:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46080"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.4",
  "summary": "CVE-2026-46080 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.141.1-1",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-46080"
  ]
}



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