AZL-88863 (CVE-2026-46190)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-05-28 10:16 – Updated: 2026-06-17 06:15 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mtd: spi-nor: debugfs: fix out-of-bounds read in spi_nor_params_show()
Sashiko noticed an out-of-bounds read [1].
In spi_nor_params_show(), the snor_f_names array is passed to spi_nor_print_flags() using sizeof(snor_f_names).
Since snor_f_names is an array of pointers, sizeof() returns the total number of bytes occupied by the pointers (element_count * sizeof(void *)) rather than the element count itself. On 64-bit systems, this makes the passed length 8x larger than intended.
Inside spi_nor_print_flags(), the 'names_len' argument is used to bounds-check the 'names' array access. An out-of-bounds read occurs if a flag bit is set that exceeds the array's actual element count but is within the inflated byte-size count.
Correct this by using ARRAY_SIZE() to pass the actual number of string pointers in the array.
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46190 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: < 6.6.141.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.141.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmtd: spi-nor: debugfs: fix out-of-bounds read in spi_nor_params_show()\n\nSashiko noticed an out-of-bounds read [1].\n\nIn spi_nor_params_show(), the snor_f_names array is passed to\nspi_nor_print_flags() using sizeof(snor_f_names).\n\nSince snor_f_names is an array of pointers, sizeof() returns the total\nnumber of bytes occupied by the pointers\n\t(element_count * sizeof(void *))\nrather than the element count itself. On 64-bit systems, this makes the\npassed length 8x larger than intended.\n\nInside spi_nor_print_flags(), the \u0027names_len\u0027 argument is used to\nbounds-check the \u0027names\u0027 array access. An out-of-bounds read occurs\nif a flag bit is set that exceeds the array\u0027s actual element count\nbut is within the inflated byte-size count.\n\nCorrect this by using ARRAY_SIZE() to pass the actual number of\nstring pointers in the array.",
"id": "AZL-88863",
"modified": "2026-06-17T06:15:31Z",
"published": "2026-05-28T10:16:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46190"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "CVE-2026-46190 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.141.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-46190"
]
}
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