AZL-88920 (CVE-2026-46119)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-05-28 10:16 – Updated: 2026-06-17 06:15 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: Fix slab-out-of-bounds access in auth message processing
If a (potentially corrupted) message of type CEPH_MSG_AUTH_REPLY contains a positive value in its result field, it is treated as an error code by ceph_handle_auth_reply() and returned to handle_auth_reply(). Thereafter, an attempt is made to send the preallocated message of type CEPH_MSG_AUTH, where the returned value is interpreted as the size of the front segment to send. If the result value in the message is greater than the size of the memory buffer allocated for the front segment, an out-of-bounds access occurs, and the content of the memory region beyond this buffer is sent out.
This patch fixes the issue by treating only negative values in the result field as errors. Positive values are therefore treated as success in the same way as a zero value. Additionally, a BUG_ON is added to __send_prepared_auth_request() comparing the len parameter to front_alloc_len to prevent sending the message if it exceeds the bounds of the allocation and to make it easier to catch any logic flaws leading to this.
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46119 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: < 6.6.141.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.141.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nlibceph: Fix slab-out-of-bounds access in auth message processing\n\nIf a (potentially corrupted) message of type CEPH_MSG_AUTH_REPLY\ncontains a positive value in its result field, it is treated as an\nerror code by ceph_handle_auth_reply() and returned to\nhandle_auth_reply(). Thereafter, an attempt is made to send the\npreallocated message of type CEPH_MSG_AUTH, where the returned value is\ninterpreted as the size of the front segment to send. If the result\nvalue in the message is greater than the size of the memory buffer\nallocated for the front segment, an out-of-bounds access occurs, and\nthe content of the memory region beyond this buffer is sent out.\n\nThis patch fixes the issue by treating only negative values in the\nresult field as errors. Positive values are therefore treated as success\nin the same way as a zero value. Additionally, a BUG_ON is added to\n__send_prepared_auth_request() comparing the len parameter to\nfront_alloc_len to prevent sending the message if it exceeds the bounds\nof the allocation and to make it easier to catch any logic flaws leading\nto this.",
"id": "AZL-88920",
"modified": "2026-06-17T06:15:31Z",
"published": "2026-05-28T10:16:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46119"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "CVE-2026-46119 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.141.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-46119"
]
}
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