AZL-88989 (CVE-2026-46186)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-05-28 10:16 – Updated: 2026-06-17 06:15 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: virtio_bt: validate rx pkt_type header length
virtbt_rx_handle() reads the leading pkt_type byte from the RX skb and forwards the remainder to hci_recv_frame() for every event/ACL/SCO/ISO type, without checking that the remaining payload is at least the fixed HCI header for that type.
After the preceding patch bounds the backend-supplied used.len to [1, VIRTBT_RX_BUF_SIZE], a one-byte completion still reaches hci_recv_frame() with skb->len already pulled to 0. If the byte happened to be HCI_ACLDATA_PKT, the ACL-vs-ISO classification fast-path in hci_dev_classify_pkt_type() dereferences hci_acl_hdr(skb)->handle whenever the HCI device has an active CIS_LINK, BIS_LINK, or PA_LINK connection, reading two bytes of uninitialized RX-buffer data. The same hazard exists for every packet type the driver accepts because none of the switch cases in virtbt_rx_handle() check skb->len against the per-type minimum HCI header size before handing the frame to the core.
After stripping pkt_type, require skb->len to cover the fixed header size for the selected type (event 2, ACL 4, SCO 3, ISO 4) before calling hci_recv_frame(); drop ratelimited otherwise. Unknown pkt_type values still take the original kfree_skb() default path.
Use bt_dev_err_ratelimited() because both the length and pkt_type values come from an untrusted backend that can otherwise flood the kernel log.
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46186 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: < 6.6.141.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.141.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: virtio_bt: validate rx pkt_type header length\n\nvirtbt_rx_handle() reads the leading pkt_type byte from the RX skb\nand forwards the remainder to hci_recv_frame() for every\nevent/ACL/SCO/ISO type, without checking that the remaining payload\nis at least the fixed HCI header for that type.\n\nAfter the preceding patch bounds the backend-supplied used.len to\n[1, VIRTBT_RX_BUF_SIZE], a one-byte completion still reaches\nhci_recv_frame() with skb-\u003elen already pulled to 0. If the byte\nhappened to be HCI_ACLDATA_PKT, the ACL-vs-ISO classification\nfast-path in hci_dev_classify_pkt_type() dereferences\nhci_acl_hdr(skb)-\u003ehandle whenever the HCI device has an active\nCIS_LINK, BIS_LINK, or PA_LINK connection, reading two bytes of\nuninitialized RX-buffer data. The same hazard exists for every\npacket type the driver accepts because none of the switch cases in\nvirtbt_rx_handle() check skb-\u003elen against the per-type minimum HCI\nheader size before handing the frame to the core.\n\nAfter stripping pkt_type, require skb-\u003elen to cover the fixed\nheader size for the selected type (event 2, ACL 4, SCO 3, ISO 4)\nbefore calling hci_recv_frame(); drop ratelimited otherwise.\nUnknown pkt_type values still take the original kfree_skb() default\npath.\n\nUse bt_dev_err_ratelimited() because both the length and pkt_type\nvalues come from an untrusted backend that can otherwise flood the\nkernel log.",
"id": "AZL-88989",
"modified": "2026-06-17T06:15:31Z",
"published": "2026-05-28T10:16:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46186"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "CVE-2026-46186 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.141.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-46186"
]
}
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