AZL-89007 (CVE-2026-46111)

Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-05-28 10:16 – Updated: 2026-06-17 06:15 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
CVE-2026-46111 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.141.1-1
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: hci_conn: fix potential UAF in create_big_sync

Add hci_conn_valid() check in create_big_sync() to detect stale connections before proceeding with BIG creation. Handle the resulting -ECANCELED in create_big_complete() and re-validate the connection under hci_dev_lock() before dereferencing, matching the pattern used by create_le_conn_complete() and create_pa_complete().

Keep the hci_conn object alive across the async boundary by taking a reference via hci_conn_get() when queueing create_big_sync(), and dropping it in the completion callback. The refcount and the lock are complementary: the refcount keeps the object allocated, while hci_dev_lock() serializes hci_conn_hash_del()'s list_del_rcu() on hdev->conn_hash, as required by hci_conn_del().

hci_conn_put() is called outside hci_dev_unlock() so the final put (which resolves to kfree() via bt_link_release) does not run under hdev->lock, though the release path would be safe either way.

Without this, create_big_complete() would unconditionally dereference the conn pointer on error, causing a use-after-free via hci_connect_cfm() and hci_conn_del().

Upstream
References
Impacted products
Ecosystem Package Version
Azure Linux:3 kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
Affected: < 6.6.141.1-1 (ecosystem)

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
        "name": "kernel",
        "purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.6.141.1-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: hci_conn: fix potential UAF in create_big_sync\n\nAdd hci_conn_valid() check in create_big_sync() to detect stale\nconnections before proceeding with BIG creation. Handle the\nresulting -ECANCELED in create_big_complete() and re-validate the\nconnection under hci_dev_lock() before dereferencing, matching the\npattern used by create_le_conn_complete() and create_pa_complete().\n\nKeep the hci_conn object alive across the async boundary by taking\na reference via hci_conn_get() when queueing create_big_sync(), and\ndropping it in the completion callback. The refcount and the lock\nare complementary: the refcount keeps the object allocated, while\nhci_dev_lock() serializes hci_conn_hash_del()\u0027s list_del_rcu() on\nhdev-\u003econn_hash, as required by hci_conn_del().\n\nhci_conn_put() is called outside hci_dev_unlock() so the final put\n(which resolves to kfree() via bt_link_release) does not run under\nhdev-\u003elock, though the release path would be safe either way.\n\nWithout this, create_big_complete() would unconditionally\ndereference the conn pointer on error, causing a use-after-free\nvia hci_connect_cfm() and hci_conn_del().",
  "id": "AZL-89007",
  "modified": "2026-06-17T06:15:31Z",
  "published": "2026-05-28T10:16:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46111"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.4",
  "summary": "CVE-2026-46111 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.141.1-1",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-46111"
  ]
}



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