AZL-89631 (CVE-2026-46276)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-06-08 17:16 – Updated: 2026-06-17 06:15 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: fix zero-size GDS range init on RDNA4
RDNA4 (GFX 12) hardware removes the GDS, GWS, and OA on-chip memory resources. The gfx_v12_0 initialisation code correctly leaves adev->gds.gds_size, adev->gds.gws_size, and adev->gds.oa_size at zero to reflect this.
amdgpu_ttm_init() unconditionally calls amdgpu_ttm_init_on_chip() for each of these resources regardless of size. When the size is zero, amdgpu_ttm_init_on_chip() forwards the call to ttm_range_man_init(), which calls drm_mm_init(mm, 0, 0). drm_mm_init() immediately fires DRM_MM_BUG_ON(start + size <= start) -- trivially true when size is zero -- crashing the kernel during modprobe of amdgpu on an RX 9070 XT.
Guard against this by returning 0 early from amdgpu_ttm_init_on_chip() when size_in_page is zero. This skips TTM resource manager registration for hardware resources that are absent, without affecting any other GPU type.
DRM_MM_BUG_ON() only asserts if CONFIG_DRM_DEBUG_MM is enabled in the kernel config. This is apparently rarely enabled as these chips have been in the market for over a year and this issue was only reported now.
Oops-Analysis: http://oops.fenrus.org/reports/bugzilla.korg/221376/report.html (cherry picked from commit 5719ce5865279cad4fd5f01011fe037168503f2d)
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46276 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: < 6.6.141.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.141.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/amdgpu: fix zero-size GDS range init on RDNA4\n\nRDNA4 (GFX 12) hardware removes the GDS, GWS, and OA on-chip memory\nresources. The gfx_v12_0 initialisation code correctly leaves\nadev-\u003egds.gds_size, adev-\u003egds.gws_size, and adev-\u003egds.oa_size at\nzero to reflect this.\n\namdgpu_ttm_init() unconditionally calls amdgpu_ttm_init_on_chip() for\neach of these resources regardless of size. When the size is zero,\namdgpu_ttm_init_on_chip() forwards the call to ttm_range_man_init(),\nwhich calls drm_mm_init(mm, 0, 0). drm_mm_init() immediately fires\nDRM_MM_BUG_ON(start + size \u003c= start) -- trivially true when size is\nzero -- crashing the kernel during modprobe of amdgpu on an RX 9070 XT.\n\nGuard against this by returning 0 early from\namdgpu_ttm_init_on_chip() when size_in_page is zero. This skips TTM\nresource manager registration for hardware resources that are absent,\nwithout affecting any other GPU type.\n\nDRM_MM_BUG_ON() only asserts if CONFIG_DRM_DEBUG_MM is enabled in\nthe kernel config. This is apparently rarely enabled as these chips\nhave been in the market for over a year and this issue was only reported\nnow.\n\nOops-Analysis: http://oops.fenrus.org/reports/bugzilla.korg/221376/report.html\n(cherry picked from commit 5719ce5865279cad4fd5f01011fe037168503f2d)",
"id": "AZL-89631",
"modified": "2026-06-17T06:15:31Z",
"published": "2026-06-08T17:16:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46276"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "CVE-2026-46276 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.141.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-46276"
]
}
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