AZL-89664 (CVE-2026-46303)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-06-08 17:16 – Updated: 2026-06-17 06:15 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
isofs: validate Rock Ridge CE continuation extent against volume size
rock_continue() reads rs->cont_extent verbatim from the Rock Ridge CE record and passes it to sb_bread() without checking that the block number is within the mounted ISO 9660 volume. commit e595447e177b ("[PATCH] rock.c: handle corrupted directories") added cont_offset and cont_size rejection for the CE continuation but did not validate the extent block number itself. commit f54e18f1b831 ("isofs: Fix infinite looping over CE entries") later capped the CE chain length at RR_MAX_CE_ENTRIES = 32 but again left the block number unchecked.
With a crafted ISO mounted via udisks2 (desktop optical auto-mount) or via CAP_SYS_ADMIN mount, rs->cont_extent can therefore point at an out-of-range block or at blocks belonging to an adjacent filesystem on the same block device. sb_bread() on an out-of-range block returns NULL cleanly via the block layer EIO path, so there is no memory-safety violation. For in-range reads of adjacent- filesystem data, the CE buffer is parsed as Rock Ridge records and only the text of SL sub-records reaches userspace through readlink(), which makes the info-leak channel narrow and difficult to exploit; still, rejecting the malformed CE outright matches the rejection shape already present in the same function for cont_offset and cont_size.
Add an ISOFS_SB(sb)->s_nzones bounds check to rock_continue() next to the existing offset/size rejection, printing the same corrupted-directory-entry notice.
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46303 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: < 6.6.141.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.141.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nisofs: validate Rock Ridge CE continuation extent against volume size\n\nrock_continue() reads rs-\u003econt_extent verbatim from the Rock Ridge CE\nrecord and passes it to sb_bread() without checking that the block\nnumber is within the mounted ISO 9660 volume. commit e595447e177b\n(\"[PATCH] rock.c: handle corrupted directories\") added cont_offset\nand cont_size rejection for the CE continuation but did not validate\nthe extent block number itself. commit f54e18f1b831 (\"isofs: Fix\ninfinite looping over CE entries\") later capped the CE chain length\nat RR_MAX_CE_ENTRIES = 32 but again left the block number unchecked.\n\nWith a crafted ISO mounted via udisks2 (desktop optical auto-mount)\nor via CAP_SYS_ADMIN mount, rs-\u003econt_extent can therefore point at\nan out-of-range block or at blocks belonging to an adjacent\nfilesystem on the same block device. sb_bread() on an out-of-range\nblock returns NULL cleanly via the block layer EIO path, so there\nis no memory-safety violation. For in-range reads of adjacent-\nfilesystem data, the CE buffer is parsed as Rock Ridge records and\nonly the text of SL sub-records reaches userspace through\nreadlink(), which makes the info-leak channel narrow and difficult\nto exploit; still, rejecting the malformed CE outright matches the\nrejection shape already present in the same function for\ncont_offset and cont_size.\n\nAdd an ISOFS_SB(sb)-\u003es_nzones bounds check to rock_continue() next\nto the existing offset/size rejection, printing the same\ncorrupted-directory-entry notice.",
"id": "AZL-89664",
"modified": "2026-06-17T06:15:31Z",
"published": "2026-06-08T17:16:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46303"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "CVE-2026-46303 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.141.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-46303"
]
}
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