AZL-92754 (CVE-2026-64117)

Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-07-19 16:17 – Updated: 2026-11-18 05:33 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
CVE-2026-64117 affecting package kernel 6.6.161.1-1
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

wifi: mac80211: capture fast-RX rate before mesh reuses skb->cb

ieee80211_invoke_fast_rx() reads RX status through IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb), which aliases the same skb->cb storage that ieee80211_rx_mesh_data() reuses as IEEE80211_TX_INFO. In the unicast forward path, mesh_data does:

info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(fwd_skb);
memset(info, 0, sizeof(*info));

on the same skb the caller still names via rx->skb, then either queues the skb for TX (success) or kfree_skb()'s it (no-route) before returning RX_QUEUED. The caller's RX_QUEUED arm then calls sta_stats_encode_rate(status) on memory that is either zeroed (success path) or freed (no-route path). The latter is KASAN slab-use-after-free in ieee80211_prepare_and_rx_handle.

Fix by encoding the rate from status before invoking ieee80211_rx_mesh_data(), so the RX_QUEUED arm consumes a value captured while status was still backed by valid memory.

Upstream
References
Impacted products
Ecosystem Package Version
Azure Linux:3 kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
Affected: ≤ 6.6.161.1-1 (ecosystem)

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
        "name": "kernel",
        "purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "6.6.161.1-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: mac80211: capture fast-RX rate before mesh reuses skb-\u003ecb\n\nieee80211_invoke_fast_rx() reads RX status through\nIEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb), which aliases the same skb-\u003ecb storage\nthat ieee80211_rx_mesh_data() reuses as IEEE80211_TX_INFO.  In the\nunicast forward path, mesh_data does:\n\n\tinfo = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(fwd_skb);\n\tmemset(info, 0, sizeof(*info));\n\non the same skb the caller still names via rx-\u003eskb, then either\nqueues the skb for TX (success) or kfree_skb()\u0027s it (no-route)\nbefore returning RX_QUEUED.  The caller\u0027s RX_QUEUED arm then\ncalls sta_stats_encode_rate(status) on memory that is either\nzeroed (success path) or freed (no-route path).  The latter is\nKASAN slab-use-after-free in ieee80211_prepare_and_rx_handle.\n\nFix by encoding the rate from status before invoking\nieee80211_rx_mesh_data(), so the RX_QUEUED arm consumes a value\ncaptured while status was still backed by valid memory.",
  "id": "AZL-92754",
  "modified": "2026-11-18T05:33:41Z",
  "published": "2026-07-19T16:17:53Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64117"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.4",
  "summary": "CVE-2026-64117 affecting package kernel 6.6.161.1-1",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-64117"
  ]
}



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