AZL-95087 (CVE-2026-68293)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-08-10 13:20 – Updated: 2026-11-05 07:22 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5: Fix MCIA register buffer overflow on 32 dword reads
The MCIA register can return up to 32 dwords (128 bytes) when the device advertises the mcia_32dwords capability, but struct mlx5_ifc_mcia_reg_bits only defines dword_0..11, leaving room for just 12 dwords (48 bytes) of data.
mlx5_query_mcia() clamps the read size to mlx5_mcia_max_bytes() and then memcpy()s that many bytes out of the register, potentially reading past the end of the 'out' buffer. On kernels built with FORTIFY_SOURCE this is caught as a buffer overflow while reading the module EEPROM via ethtool:
detected buffer overflow in memcpy kernel BUG at lib/string_helpers.c:1048! RIP: 0010:fortify_panic+0x13/0x20 Call Trace: mlx5_query_mcia.isra.0+0x200/0x210 [mlx5_core] mlx5_query_module_eeprom_by_page+0x4a/0xa0 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_get_module_eeprom_by_page+0xbb/0x120 [mlx5_core] eeprom_prepare_data+0xf3/0x170 ethnl_default_doit+0xf1/0x3b0
Extend the mcia_reg layout to 32 dwords.
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68293 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: < 6.6.161.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.161.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/mlx5: Fix MCIA register buffer overflow on 32 dword reads\n\nThe MCIA register can return up to 32 dwords (128 bytes) when the device\nadvertises the mcia_32dwords capability, but struct\nmlx5_ifc_mcia_reg_bits only defines dword_0..11, leaving room for just\n12 dwords (48 bytes) of data.\n\nmlx5_query_mcia() clamps the read size to mlx5_mcia_max_bytes() and then\nmemcpy()s that many bytes out of the register, potentially reading past\nthe end of the \u0027out\u0027 buffer. On kernels built with FORTIFY_SOURCE this\nis caught as a buffer overflow while reading the module EEPROM via\nethtool:\n\n detected buffer overflow in memcpy\n kernel BUG at lib/string_helpers.c:1048!\n RIP: 0010:fortify_panic+0x13/0x20\n Call Trace:\n mlx5_query_mcia.isra.0+0x200/0x210 [mlx5_core]\n mlx5_query_module_eeprom_by_page+0x4a/0xa0 [mlx5_core]\n mlx5e_get_module_eeprom_by_page+0xbb/0x120 [mlx5_core]\n eeprom_prepare_data+0xf3/0x170\n ethnl_default_doit+0xf1/0x3b0\n\nExtend the mcia_reg layout to 32 dwords.",
"id": "AZL-95087",
"modified": "2026-11-05T07:22:58Z",
"published": "2026-08-10T13:20:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68293"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "CVE-2026-68293 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.161.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-68293"
]
}
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