AZL-96387 (CVE-2026-72404)

Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-08-15 06:22 – Updated: 2026-11-05 07:22 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
CVE-2026-72404 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.161.1-1
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

tipc: fix UAF in cleanup_bearer() due to premature dst_cache_destroy()

TIPC UDP media bearer teardown calls dst_cache_destroy() on its replicast caches before calling synchronize_net() to wait for concurrent RCU readers (transmitters) to finish:

static void cleanup_bearer(struct work_struct *work) { ... list_for_each_entry_safe(rcast, tmp, &ub->rcast.list, list) { dst_cache_destroy(&rcast->dst_cache); list_del_rcu(&rcast->list); kfree_rcu(rcast, rcu); } ... dst_cache_destroy(&ub->rcast.dst_cache); udp_tunnel_sock_release(ub->sk); synchronize_net(); ... }

This is highly buggy because dst_cache_destroy() immediately frees the per-CPU cache memory (free_percpu()) and releases the cached dst entries without any synchronization.

If a concurrent transmitter (e.g., tipc_udp_xmit()) is running on another CPU under RCU protection, it can call dst_cache_get() concurrently, leading to: 1. Use-After-Free on the per-CPU cache pointer itself (crash). 2. "rcuref - imbalanced put()" warning if it attempts to release a dst that was concurrently released by dst_cache_destroy().

Furthermore, calling kfree(ub) immediately after synchronize_net() without closing the socket first (or waiting after closing it) leaves a window where a concurrent receiver (tipc_udp_recv()) could start after synchronize_net(), access ub, and suffer a UAF when kfree(ub) runs.

To fix this, we must defer dst_cache_destroy() and kfree(ub) until after we have ensured that no more readers can see the bearer/socket and all existing readers have finished:

  1. Defer rcast entry destruction (both dst_cache_destroy() and kfree()) to an RCU callback using call_rcu_hurry(). Using call_rcu_hurry() ensures the dst entries are released quickly.

  2. Release the bearer socket using udp_tunnel_sock_release() (stops new receive readers).

  3. Call synchronize_net() to wait for all outstanding RCU readers (both transmit and receive) to finish.

  4. Now that it is safe, call dst_cache_destroy() on the main bearer cache, and free ub.

Note: 3) and 4) can be changed later in net-next to also use call_rcu_hurry() and get rid of the synchronize_net() latency.

Upstream
References
Impacted products
Ecosystem Package Version
Azure Linux:3 kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
Affected: < 6.6.161.1-1 (ecosystem)

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
        "name": "kernel",
        "purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.6.161.1-1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntipc: fix UAF in cleanup_bearer() due to premature dst_cache_destroy()\n\nTIPC UDP media bearer teardown calls dst_cache_destroy() on its\nreplicast caches before calling synchronize_net() to wait for\nconcurrent RCU readers (transmitters) to finish:\n\nstatic void cleanup_bearer(struct work_struct *work)\n{\n...\n\tlist_for_each_entry_safe(rcast, tmp, \u0026ub-\u003ercast.list, list) {\n\t\tdst_cache_destroy(\u0026rcast-\u003edst_cache);\n\t\tlist_del_rcu(\u0026rcast-\u003elist);\n\t\tkfree_rcu(rcast, rcu);\n\t}\n...\n\tdst_cache_destroy(\u0026ub-\u003ercast.dst_cache);\n\tudp_tunnel_sock_release(ub-\u003esk);\n\tsynchronize_net();\n...\n}\n\nThis is highly buggy because dst_cache_destroy() immediately frees the\nper-CPU cache memory (free_percpu()) and releases the cached dst\nentries without any synchronization.\n\nIf a concurrent transmitter (e.g., tipc_udp_xmit()) is running on another\nCPU under RCU protection, it can call dst_cache_get() concurrently,\nleading to:\n1. Use-After-Free on the per-CPU cache pointer itself (crash).\n2. \"rcuref - imbalanced put()\" warning if it attempts to release a\n   dst that was concurrently released by dst_cache_destroy().\n\nFurthermore, calling kfree(ub) immediately after synchronize_net() without\nclosing the socket first (or waiting after closing it) leaves a window\nwhere a concurrent receiver (tipc_udp_recv()) could start after\nsynchronize_net(), access ub, and suffer a UAF when kfree(ub) runs.\n\nTo fix this, we must defer dst_cache_destroy() and kfree(ub) until after\nwe have ensured that no more readers can see the bearer/socket and all\nexisting readers have finished:\n\n1. Defer rcast entry destruction (both dst_cache_destroy() and kfree())\n   to an RCU callback using call_rcu_hurry().\n   Using call_rcu_hurry() ensures the dst entries are released quickly.\n\n2. Release the bearer socket using udp_tunnel_sock_release() (stops\n   new receive readers).\n\n3. Call synchronize_net() to wait for all outstanding RCU readers\n   (both transmit and receive) to finish.\n\n4. Now that it is safe, call dst_cache_destroy() on the main bearer\n   cache, and free ub.\n\nNote: 3) and 4) can be changed later in net-next to also use\ncall_rcu_hurry() and get rid of the synchronize_net() latency.",
  "id": "AZL-96387",
  "modified": "2026-11-05T07:22:58Z",
  "published": "2026-08-15T06:22:13Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72404"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.4",
  "summary": "CVE-2026-72404 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.161.1-1",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-72404"
  ]
}



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