AZL-96555 (CVE-2026-74519)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-08-15 13:17 – Updated: 2026-09-22 19:07 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pinctrl: devicetree: don't free uninitialized dev_name on error path
dt_remember_or_free_map() duplicates dev_name for each map entry. If kstrdup_const() fails, dt_free_map() frees dev_name in all num_maps entries, including entries that have not been initialized.
Some pinctrl drivers, including pinctrl-imx, allocate the map with kmalloc() and leave dev_name for the core to initialize. The untouched entries therefore contain uninitialized data which is passed to kfree_const().
Reproduced on qemu's mcimx6ul-evk (pinctrl-imx) with failslab injection while binding the pinctrl-consuming device, under KASAN:
BUG: KASAN: double-free in dt_free_map+0x34/0xa4 Free of addr c425a900 by task init/1 kfree from dt_free_map+0x34/0xa4 dt_free_map from dt_remember_or_free_map+0x184/0x198 dt_remember_or_free_map from pinctrl_dt_to_map+0x33c/0x4c8 pinctrl_dt_to_map from create_pinctrl+0x9c/0x5c0
Initialize all dev_name fields to NULL before duplicating the device name, making the full-map cleanup safe after a partial failure.
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74519 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: < 6.6.152.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.152.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\npinctrl: devicetree: don\u0027t free uninitialized dev_name on error path\n\ndt_remember_or_free_map() duplicates dev_name for each map entry. If\nkstrdup_const() fails, dt_free_map() frees dev_name in all num_maps\nentries, including entries that have not been initialized.\n\nSome pinctrl drivers, including pinctrl-imx, allocate the map with\nkmalloc() and leave dev_name for the core to initialize. The untouched\nentries therefore contain uninitialized data which is passed to\nkfree_const().\n\nReproduced on qemu\u0027s mcimx6ul-evk (pinctrl-imx) with failslab injection\nwhile binding the pinctrl-consuming device, under KASAN:\n\n BUG: KASAN: double-free in dt_free_map+0x34/0xa4\n Free of addr c425a900 by task init/1\n kfree from dt_free_map+0x34/0xa4\n dt_free_map from dt_remember_or_free_map+0x184/0x198\n dt_remember_or_free_map from pinctrl_dt_to_map+0x33c/0x4c8\n pinctrl_dt_to_map from create_pinctrl+0x9c/0x5c0\n\nInitialize all dev_name fields to NULL before duplicating the device\nname, making the full-map cleanup safe after a partial failure.",
"id": "AZL-96555",
"modified": "2026-09-22T19:07:04Z",
"published": "2026-08-15T13:17:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74519"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "CVE-2026-74519 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.152.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-74519"
]
}
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