AZL-97097 (CVE-2026-74635)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-08-22 16:16 – Updated: 2026-09-22 19:07 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fbdev: bitblit: bound-check glyph index in bit_cursor()
bit_cursor() fetches the glyph under the cursor with
c = scr_readw(vc_pos);
src = vc_font.data + ((c & charmask) * w * height);
where charmask is 0x1ff when vc_hi_font_mask is set. The screen buffer value comes directly from scr_readw() and may be larger than the current font's glyph count.
Syzkaller triggers this via vcs_write(). The Call Trace shows vcs_write() in vc_screen.c writing an arbitrary 16-bit value with writev() to /dev/vcsa, which vcs_write_buf() in vc_screen.c stores via vcs_scr_writew() without checking charcount. The stored value is later read in bit_cursor() in bitblit.c.
When the font is changed from a font with 512 glyphs to a font with 256 glyphs, the screen buffer can retain characters with the high bit set from the previous mode, which could also produce the same out-of-bounds access.
BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in soft_cursor+0x378/0x6bc drivers/video/fbdev/core/softcursor.c:70 Read of size 16 at addr ffff800086c57970
Call Trace: soft_cursor+0x378/0x6bc drivers/video/fbdev/core/softcursor.c:70 bit_cursor+0xa90/0x1108 drivers/video/fbdev/core/bitblit.c:365 fbcon_cursor+0x344/0x498 drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c:1427 hide_cursor+0xdc/0x2d0 drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:883 update_region+0x100/0x18c drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:669 vcs_write+0x8ec/0xaf0 drivers/tty/vt/vc_screen.c:685
bit_putcs_aligned() and bit_putcs_unaligned() already clamp the glyph index to vc_font.charcount. Apply the same clamp in bit_cursor() after extracting the attribute and masking, before indexing fontdata.
The fix completes the bounds checking started in commit 18c4ef4e765a ("fbdev: bitblit: bound-check glyph index in bit_putcs*"), which missed the cursor path.
This change should be safe because the clamp reuses the existing contract from fbcon: charcount is maintained under console_lock in con_font_set() and fbcon_font_set(), and hi_font_mask is cleared when switching from 512 to 256 glyphs. When stale screen data with high bits remains after a font switch, or when vcs_write() stores an arbitrary value, clamping the index to 0 prevents the out-of-bounds read without changing cursor semantics — the same fallback bit_putcs uses.
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74635 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: < 6.6.152.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.152.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nfbdev: bitblit: bound-check glyph index in bit_cursor()\n\nbit_cursor() fetches the glyph under the cursor with\n\n\tc = scr_readw(vc_pos);\n\tsrc = vc_font.data + ((c \u0026 charmask) * w * height);\n\nwhere charmask is 0x1ff when vc_hi_font_mask is set. The screen buffer\nvalue comes directly from scr_readw() and may be larger than the current\nfont\u0027s glyph count.\n\nSyzkaller triggers this via vcs_write(). The Call Trace shows\nvcs_write() in vc_screen.c writing an arbitrary 16-bit value with\nwritev() to /dev/vcsa, which vcs_write_buf() in vc_screen.c stores via\nvcs_scr_writew() without checking charcount. The stored value is later\nread in bit_cursor() in bitblit.c.\n\nWhen the font is changed from a font with 512 glyphs to a font with\n256 glyphs, the screen buffer can retain characters with the high\nbit set from the previous mode, which could also produce the same\nout-of-bounds access.\n\n BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in soft_cursor+0x378/0x6bc drivers/video/fbdev/core/softcursor.c:70\n Read of size 16 at addr ffff800086c57970\n\n Call Trace:\n soft_cursor+0x378/0x6bc drivers/video/fbdev/core/softcursor.c:70\n bit_cursor+0xa90/0x1108 drivers/video/fbdev/core/bitblit.c:365\n fbcon_cursor+0x344/0x498 drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c:1427\n hide_cursor+0xdc/0x2d0 drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:883\n update_region+0x100/0x18c drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:669\n vcs_write+0x8ec/0xaf0 drivers/tty/vt/vc_screen.c:685\n\nbit_putcs_aligned() and bit_putcs_unaligned() already clamp the glyph\nindex to vc_font.charcount. Apply the same clamp in bit_cursor() after\nextracting the attribute and masking, before indexing fontdata.\n\nThe fix completes the bounds checking started in commit 18c4ef4e765a\n(\"fbdev: bitblit: bound-check glyph index in bit_putcs*\"), which missed\nthe cursor path.\n\nThis change should be safe because the clamp reuses the existing\ncontract from fbcon: charcount is maintained under console_lock in\ncon_font_set() and fbcon_font_set(), and hi_font_mask is cleared when\nswitching from 512 to 256 glyphs. When stale screen data with high bits\nremains after a font switch, or when vcs_write() stores an arbitrary\nvalue, clamping the index to 0 prevents the out-of-bounds read without\nchanging cursor semantics \u2014 the same fallback bit_putcs uses.",
"id": "AZL-97097",
"modified": "2026-09-22T19:07:04Z",
"published": "2026-08-22T16:16:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74635"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "CVE-2026-74635 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.152.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-74635"
]
}
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