AZL-97176 (CVE-2026-74673)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-08-22 16:16 – Updated: 2026-09-22 19:07 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: evdev - fix information leak in evdev_pass_values()
In evdev_pass_values(), the input_event structure is allocated on the kernel stack and populated field-by-field. However, it is never fully initialized. On architectures where struct input_event contains explicit or implicit padding (such as the 32-bit __pad field on SPARC64), these padding bytes are left uninitialized.
When this event structure is subsequently passed to the client buffer and later copied to userspace, the uninitialized padding bytes leak kernel stack memory, potentially exposing sensitive information.
Similar issues exist in __evdev_queue_syn_dropped and __pass_event.
Fix this by explicitly zeroing the entire event structure with memset() before populating its fields. This ensures all padding bytes are cleared before the data crosses the security boundary.
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74673 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: < 6.6.152.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.152.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nInput: evdev - fix information leak in evdev_pass_values()\n\nIn evdev_pass_values(), the input_event structure is allocated on the\nkernel stack and populated field-by-field. However, it is never fully\ninitialized. On architectures where struct input_event contains explicit\nor implicit padding (such as the 32-bit __pad field on SPARC64), these\npadding bytes are left uninitialized.\n\nWhen this event structure is subsequently passed to the client buffer\nand later copied to userspace, the uninitialized padding bytes leak\nkernel stack memory, potentially exposing sensitive information.\n\nSimilar issues exist in __evdev_queue_syn_dropped and __pass_event.\n\nFix this by explicitly zeroing the entire event structure with memset()\nbefore populating its fields. This ensures all padding bytes are cleared\nbefore the data crosses the security boundary.",
"id": "AZL-97176",
"modified": "2026-09-22T19:07:04Z",
"published": "2026-08-22T16:16:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74673"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "CVE-2026-74673 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.152.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-74673"
]
}
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