AZL-97266 (CVE-2026-74726)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-08-22 16:16 – Updated: 2026-09-22 19:07 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bonding: alb: re-check primary_is_promisc under RTNL in bond_alb_monitor
bond_alb_monitor() reads primary_is_promisc under RCU, then drops RCU and takes RTNL via rtnl_trylock() before undoing the promiscuity it set on the active slave. In that window the active slave can change under RTNL (RTM_DELLINK -> __bond_release_one() -> bond_alb_handle_active_change()), which already drops the promiscuity and clears primary_is_promisc. The monitor still acts on the stale decision: if the slave was removed with no failover, curr_active_slave is now NULL and the deref faults; if it failed over, the stale dev_set_promiscuity(-1) underflows the new slave's promiscuity counter and pins it in IFF_PROMISC.
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address ... KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] Workqueue: b42 bond_alb_monitor RIP: 0010:bond_alb_monitor (drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c:1600) process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3322) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3486) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158) Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
Re-check primary_is_promisc (and curr_active_slave) after taking RTNL so the monitor only undoes an increment it still owns. The other bonding monitors already re-read state under RTNL in their commit phase (bond_miimon_commit/bond_ab_arp_commit); bond_alb_monitor() was the only one acting on the pre-trylock decision.
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74726 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: < 6.6.152.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.152.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbonding: alb: re-check primary_is_promisc under RTNL in bond_alb_monitor\n\nbond_alb_monitor() reads primary_is_promisc under RCU, then drops RCU and\ntakes RTNL via rtnl_trylock() before undoing the promiscuity it set on the\nactive slave. In that window the active slave can change under RTNL\n(RTM_DELLINK -\u003e __bond_release_one() -\u003e bond_alb_handle_active_change()),\nwhich already drops the promiscuity and clears primary_is_promisc. The\nmonitor still acts on the stale decision: if the slave was removed with no\nfailover, curr_active_slave is now NULL and the deref faults; if it failed\nover, the stale dev_set_promiscuity(-1) underflows the new slave\u0027s\npromiscuity counter and pins it in IFF_PROMISC.\n\n Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address ...\n KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]\n Workqueue: b42 bond_alb_monitor\n RIP: 0010:bond_alb_monitor (drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c:1600)\n process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3322)\n worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3486)\n kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)\n ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158)\n Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception\n\nRe-check primary_is_promisc (and curr_active_slave) after taking RTNL so\nthe monitor only undoes an increment it still owns. The other bonding\nmonitors already re-read state under RTNL in their commit phase\n(bond_miimon_commit/bond_ab_arp_commit); bond_alb_monitor() was the only\none acting on the pre-trylock decision.",
"id": "AZL-97266",
"modified": "2026-09-22T19:07:04Z",
"published": "2026-08-22T16:16:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74726"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "CVE-2026-74726 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.152.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-74726"
]
}
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