AZL-97689 (CVE-2026-80528)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-08-26 15:17 – Updated: 2026-09-23 19:05 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: avoid fs reclaim while using current->journal_info
handle_reply() stores a ceph_mds_request pointer in
current->journal_info while filling the inode and dentry cache from
an MDS reply.
An allocation in this section can enter direct reclaim and prune
dentries from another filesystem. If this dirties an ext4 inode, ext4
starts a JBD2 transaction. JBD2 interprets the Ceph request in
current->journal_info as a journal handle and dereferences the
request's r_tid as h_transaction, causing a kernel crash, e.g.:
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 00000000077b4818 [...] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 2699135 Comm: kworker/6:3 Tainted: G W 6.18.38-i3 #1113 NONE [...] Workqueue: ceph-msgr ceph_con_workfn pstate: 80400009 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : jbd2__journal_start+0x2c/0x208 lr : __ext4_journal_start_sb+0x100/0x178 [...] Call trace: jbd2__journal_start+0x2c/0x208 (P) __ext4_journal_start_sb+0x100/0x178 ext4_dirty_inode+0x3c/0x90 __mark_inode_dirty+0x58/0x400 iput.part.0+0x2b0/0x370 iput+0x18/0x30 dentry_unlink_inode+0xc0/0x158 __dentry_kill+0x80/0x250 shrink_dentry_list+0x90/0x130 prune_dcache_sb+0x60/0x98 super_cache_scan+0xe8/0x190 do_shrink_slab+0x174/0x388 shrink_slab+0xd8/0x4c0 shrink_node+0x31c/0x908 do_try_to_free_pages+0xd0/0x508 try_to_free_pages+0x11c/0x238 __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x4d0/0xdd0 __folio_alloc_noprof+0x18/0x70 __filemap_get_folio+0x248/0x440 ceph_readdir_prepopulate+0x570/0x9e8 mds_dispatch+0x1424/0x1ba0 ceph_con_process_message+0x74/0xa0 ceph_con_v1_try_read+0x3a0/0x1510 ceph_con_workfn+0x260/0x460
Enter a scoped NOFS allocation context and leave it after clearing
journal_info. This prevents filesystem reclaim from recursing into
another filesystem while the field contains Ceph-private data.
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80528 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: < 6.6.157.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.157.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nceph: avoid fs reclaim while using current-\u003ejournal_info\n\nhandle_reply() stores a `ceph_mds_request` pointer in\n`current-\u003ejournal_info` while filling the inode and dentry cache from\nan MDS reply.\n\nAn allocation in this section can enter direct reclaim and prune\ndentries from another filesystem. If this dirties an ext4 inode, ext4\nstarts a JBD2 transaction. JBD2 interprets the Ceph request in\n`current-\u003ejournal_info` as a journal handle and dereferences the\nrequest\u0027s `r_tid` as `h_transaction`, causing a kernel crash, e.g.:\n\n Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 00000000077b4818\n [...]\n Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] SMP\n Modules linked in:\n CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 2699135 Comm: kworker/6:3 Tainted: G W 6.18.38-i3 #1113 NONE\n [...]\n Workqueue: ceph-msgr ceph_con_workfn\n pstate: 80400009 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)\n pc : jbd2__journal_start+0x2c/0x208\n lr : __ext4_journal_start_sb+0x100/0x178\n [...]\n Call trace:\n jbd2__journal_start+0x2c/0x208 (P)\n __ext4_journal_start_sb+0x100/0x178\n ext4_dirty_inode+0x3c/0x90\n __mark_inode_dirty+0x58/0x400\n iput.part.0+0x2b0/0x370\n iput+0x18/0x30\n dentry_unlink_inode+0xc0/0x158\n __dentry_kill+0x80/0x250\n shrink_dentry_list+0x90/0x130\n prune_dcache_sb+0x60/0x98\n super_cache_scan+0xe8/0x190\n do_shrink_slab+0x174/0x388\n shrink_slab+0xd8/0x4c0\n shrink_node+0x31c/0x908\n do_try_to_free_pages+0xd0/0x508\n try_to_free_pages+0x11c/0x238\n __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x4d0/0xdd0\n __folio_alloc_noprof+0x18/0x70\n __filemap_get_folio+0x248/0x440\n ceph_readdir_prepopulate+0x570/0x9e8\n mds_dispatch+0x1424/0x1ba0\n ceph_con_process_message+0x74/0xa0\n ceph_con_v1_try_read+0x3a0/0x1510\n ceph_con_workfn+0x260/0x460\n\nEnter a scoped NOFS allocation context and leave it after clearing\n`journal_info`. This prevents filesystem reclaim from recursing into\nanother filesystem while the field contains Ceph-private data.",
"id": "AZL-97689",
"modified": "2026-09-23T19:05:44Z",
"published": "2026-08-26T15:17:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80528"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "CVE-2026-80528 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.157.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-80528"
]
}
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