AZL-98081 (CVE-2026-80678)
Vulnerability from osv_azurelinux – Published: 2026-08-28 08:16 – Updated: 2026-09-22 19:07 – Source websiteIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i2c: imx: Fix slave registration race and error handling
In i2c_imx_reg_slave(), the slave pointer was assigned before pm_runtime_resume_and_get(). If pm_runtime_resume_and_get() failed, the error path returned without clearing i2c_imx->slave, leaving it non-NULL and causing all subsequent registration attempts to fail with -EBUSY.
Additionally, because this driver uses a shared IRQ, the interrupt handler i2c_imx_isr() can execute concurrently and, after acquiring slave_lock, dereference i2c_imx->slave. The previous fix attempt added a lockless i2c_imx->slave = NULL on the error path, but that could race with the ISR under the lock and still cause a NULL pointer dereference.
Fix both issues by deferring the assignment of i2c_imx->slave and i2c_imx->last_slave_event to after a successful resume, and by performing the assignment inside the slave_lock critical section. This guarantees that the slave pointer is never left stale on the error path and is always valid when observed by the interrupt handler.
| URL | Type |
|---|---|
| https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80678 | WEB |
| Ecosystem | Package | Version |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Linux:3 |
kernel
pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel
|
Affected: < 6.6.152.1-1 (ecosystem)
|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Azure Linux:3",
"name": "kernel",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/azure-linux/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.152.1-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ni2c: imx: Fix slave registration race and error handling\n\nIn i2c_imx_reg_slave(), the slave pointer was assigned before\npm_runtime_resume_and_get(). If pm_runtime_resume_and_get() failed,\nthe error path returned without clearing i2c_imx-\u003eslave, leaving it\nnon-NULL and causing all subsequent registration attempts to fail\nwith -EBUSY.\n\nAdditionally, because this driver uses a shared IRQ, the interrupt\nhandler i2c_imx_isr() can execute concurrently and, after acquiring\nslave_lock, dereference i2c_imx-\u003eslave. The previous fix attempt\nadded a lockless i2c_imx-\u003eslave = NULL on the error path, but that\ncould race with the ISR under the lock and still cause a NULL pointer\ndereference.\n\nFix both issues by deferring the assignment of i2c_imx-\u003eslave and\ni2c_imx-\u003elast_slave_event to after a successful resume, and by\nperforming the assignment inside the slave_lock critical section.\nThis guarantees that the slave pointer is never left stale on the\nerror path and is always valid when observed by the interrupt handler.",
"id": "AZL-98081",
"modified": "2026-09-22T19:07:04Z",
"published": "2026-08-28T08:16:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80678"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "CVE-2026-80678 affecting package kernel for versions less than 6.6.152.1-1",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-80678"
]
}
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